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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the Degree of M.C.M. 
 
Fixed Asset Revaluation: Management Incentives and Market Reactions 
 
Ink Tay 
 
There is a lack of relevant research of fixed assets revaluation practices in New Zealand. This 
study provides some insights as (1) why some New Zealand firms choose to revalue their 
fixed assets; (2) when will a firm revalue its fixed assets; and (3) whether fixed asset 
revaluation provides information to investors. This research attempts to explain the 
motivations of the management‟s fixed asset revaluation decision in New Zealand. The 
empirical analysis includes five common explanatory variables, such as gearing (debt-equity 
ratio), liquidity, market-to-book ratio, firm size, and fixed asset intensity. In addition, the 
relationship between asset revaluation and share price movements of the firms are examined 
to determine the perceived usefulness of fixed asset revaluation information for the capital 
market in New Zealand.   
 
The study results show that fixed asset intensity and firm size significantly contribute to the 
revaluation decision. In contrast to the findings of previous studies (Whittred and Chan, 1992; 
Brown, Izan, and Loh, 1992; and Missionier-Piera, 2007), the level of corporate gearing is 
negatively related to the probability of revaluing assets for the sample of New Zealand firms 
in this study. However, the effect of the level of gearing on the revaluation decision is 
insignificant. The empirical results did not show any significant outcomes and relationships 
for investigated year 1998. This is because 1998 signified the end of recession and the 
beginning of economic growth in New Zealand. At the end of a recession, the changes in the 
country‟s economic environment might have superseded individual firms‟ considerations in 
management decision making process.  
 
The empirical results show that the practice of revaluation increased sharply with the 
adoption of the IFRS in 2005 in New Zealand. About 28.1% of the revaluation 
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announcements under study were made in 2005 compared to just over 15.8% in 2001. 
Furthermore, the empirical results show negative returns accrue to firms prior to the 
publication of financial statements that carry revaluation announcements. These negative 
returns are reverted as soon as the revaluation information is made public. These gains are 
again maintained for at least a month after the announcements are made. Comparing frequent 
revaluers to first time revaluers, the results show that asset revaluation information is relevant 
to investors. Frequent revaluers gained only 0.8% announcement abnormal returns while First 
time revaluers gained over 4% in the 2005. 
 
Keywords: fixed asset revaluation, management incentives, market reaction. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1    Background 
 
Non-current assets, also referred to fixed assets, are assets which have been purchased by 
firms with the intention of being held or used for a period longer than one year from balance 
date. Fixed assets are not intended for resale in the normal course of trading. Contrary to 
current assets, fixed assets do not consist cash or other assets that are reasonably expected to 
be converted into cash, sold or consumed by the firms within their operating cycle or within 
12 months of the balance date (Clark, Maguire, and Davies, 2006). Fixed assets with finite 
useful lives will gradually lose their value over time because of age, wear, or market 
conditions. Firms, therefore, are required to recognise the loss of value of those assets across 
their useful lives (White, Sondhi, and Fried, 1998). 
 
 
New Zealand Financial Reporting Standard No. 3 Accounting for Property, Plant and 
Equipment (FRS 3) defines depreciation as “the consumption of the economic benefits 
embodied in an asset whether arising from use, the passing of time or obsolescence” (ICANZ, 
2002, Section 4.22). There are two major purposes of depreciation. The first major purpose is 
to distribute the cost of fixed assets to income over a period to achieve the accurate 
measurements of income and the second major purpose of depreciation is to retain funds of a 
business by reducing income and thereby reducing the distribution of dividend to 
shareholders (Westwood, 1995). FRS 3 requires the depreciation of all depreciable assets to 
be charged to the profit and loss account on a systematic basis throughout the useful life of 
the assets. Thus, depreciable assets such as buildings, machines, furniture, computers, office 
equipments and motor vehicles are entitled to the favourable tax treatment or depreciation 
allowance over current assets (Wikipedia, 2006a). 
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Fixed assets are depreciated based on their estimated useful lives and residual values. Due to 
the fact that the estimated useful life and residual value of a fixed asset may change over 
time, firms are required to make adjustment if they become aware that the estimated useful 
life or residual value of that asset is likely to vary significantly. Likewise, the value of fixed 
assets may vary from time to time. Therefore, firms may wish to revalue their fixed assets to 
reflect the changes in the value of their fixed assets to reflect the market worth of their 
property assets. 
 
 
Asset revaluation refers to the reconsideration of the value of an asset and adjusts the book 
value of that asset to its current value (Brown, Izan, and Loh, 1992). Fixed asset revaluation 
can be either upward (revaluation increments) or downward (revaluation decrements). 
Upward revaluation is the restatement of the book value of an asset to the extent that it does 
not exceed its net current value or recoverable value. In short, an upward revaluation refers to 
the incremental value of an asset‟s book value whereas downward revaluation means that the 
net current value of the asset has fallen below its book value. An upward revaluation of fixed-
assets increases the value of shareholders‟ equity and the value of the fixed-assets involved.  
Upward revaluations also decrease financial-leverage ratios, such as debt-equity ratios.  
 
 
When an asset is revalued, any increased amount of depreciation as a result of the revaluation 
will be debited to „Revaluation Reserve‟. Likewise, whenever the revalued asset is sold, the 
loss encountered due to the revaluation will be debited to „Revaluation Reserve‟. The 
increment or decrement amount of each class of assets as a result of revaluation will be 
shown in the Balance Sheet for a specified number of years and the increased/decreased value 
of assets will be shown in place of their original cost in the Balance Sheet (Westwood, 1995). 
 
 
 
If a fixed asset‟s book value is increased as a result of the revaluation, the increased amount 
should be credited directly to equity under the heading of „Revaluation Reserve‟. If the fixed 
asset‟s book value is decreased as a result of a revaluation, the decreased amount should be 
recognised in the Profit & Loss account. However, in case of an upward revaluation of a 
fixed asset which has been previously subject to downward revaluation, the increased value 
 3 | P a g e  
 
of the asset should be recognised in the Profit & Loss account to the extent that it reverses the 
revaluation decrement of the same asset which is previously recognised in the Profit & Loss 
account. Similarly, in case of a downward revaluation of a fixed asset which has been 
previously subject to upward revaluation, the decreased amount should be recognised in the 
„Revaluation Reserve‟ to the extent that it reverses the credit balance of that asset in the 
„Revaluation Reserve‟ (Courtenay and Cahan, 2004). 
 
1.1.1 Underlying Rationale of Revaluation Decisions 
The justification for the revaluation of fixed-assets by firms is to assure that the fair value of 
fixed-assets is reflected in the firm balance sheets. There are different factors that have been 
found by prior researchers (for example, Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Brown et al., 1992) 
for asset revaluation decisions. These include desire to increase borrowing capacity, takeover 
threats, issuance of bonus shares, likelihood of the violation of debt covenant, indebtedness, 
labour strikes, decline in the operating cash flow, growth prospect, and liquidity (Lin and 
Peasnell, 2000a). There are also a number of motivations for revaluing assets, for example, 
(1) to show the true rate of return on capital employed; (2) to show fair market value of the 
assets employed in case of sale and leaseback transaction; (3) to retain adequate fund in the 
firm for future replacement of fixed assets. The depreciation of assets based on the historical 
cost will result in greater profit which leads to excessive dividend payment; (4) to obtain 
bargaining power for fair value of assets before merging with or take over by another firm; 
and (5) for proper internal or external reconstruction (Wikipedia, 2006b). 
 
1.1.2 Fixed Asset Revaluation and Share Price Movements 
Fixed asset revaluation information could be useful for investors‟ decision-making. The 
efficient market hypothesis provides the rational for understanding changes in the market 
prices of financial assets. The efficient market hypothesis postulates that at any given time, 
financial asset prices fully reflect all available information. The hypothesis implies that all 
investors have access to all relevant information and that all investors use that information 
efficiently (Brealey and Myers, 2004). Hence, the revaluation of fixed asset which provides 
more relevant information for investors would result in the changes of the share prices of a 
firm (Sharpe and Walker, 1975). 
 
1.1.3 Revaluation Practice in New Zealand 
Revaluation of fixed assets can provide users of financial statements with more timely and 
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relevant financial information than the valuation based on original transaction cost (White et 
al., 1998). As recorded in FRS-3, “Items of property, plant and equipment are often a major 
portion of the total assets of an entity and therefore significant in the presentation of its 
position…recognising changes in the value of items of property, plant, and equipment is 
considered to provide relevant information to users of financial reports” (ICANZ, 2002, 
Section 1.3 -1.4). 
 
 
To date, fixed asset revaluations remain prohibited in the U.S. Unlike in U.S., firms in New 
Zealand are given options for fixed asset revaluation (Easton, Eddey, and Harris, 1993). In 
New Zealand, all fixed assets acquired by firms are required to be initially recorded at their 
original transaction cost and the firms may choose to revalue the fixed assets in a subsequent 
period (Westwood, 1995). 
 
 
Firms are allowed to revalue their fixed assets, provided that fair value is used. „Fair Value‟ is 
commonly known as „Market Value‟, „Open Market Value‟, and „Current Market Value‟ (The 
Treasury, 2006). According to FRS 3, “fair value is the amount for which an asset could be 
exchanged, or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm‟s length 
transaction” (ICANZ, 2002, Section 4.23). Hence, fair value of a fixed asset could be 
determined by referring to its current market price or price in an active market for the similar 
asset. In cases where market-based evidence of fair value of a fixed asset is not available, 
depreciated replacement cost (DRC) could be used as a proxy to determine the fair value of 
that asset.  
 
 
Selective revaluation happens when firms choose to revalue selected tangible asset(s). The 
revaluation of particular assets will result in situations where only selected assets will be 
shown at current values (Wikipedia, 2006b). Although firms in New Zealand may choose to 
revalue their fixed assets, FRS 3 states that where a revaluation policy is adopted by a firm, it 
must be applied to the whole class of fixed assets. Once a firm has chosen to revalue its fixed 
assets, it is required to continue revaluing the relevant classes of assets on a cyclical basis (at 
least every five years). This is to avoid situations where firms may choose to revalue selected 
fixed assets and inconsistency in the treatment of the similar assets.  
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Besides, when a fixed asset is revalued, firm is required to keep the valuation of the asset up-
to-date. NZ IAS 16 requires frequent revaluations for assets which experience volatile 
changes in their fair value (NZICA, 2004). Further revaluation should be carried out if the 
fair value of an asset is differing materially from its revalued amount. In addition, it is 
required to use independent qualified valuer for revaluations, except for the valuations of 
plant and equipment where there is an active market or readily available price for such assets. 
When the valuation is conducted by an internal qualified valuer, the basis of valuation will be 
subjected to review by an independent valuer (Deloitte, 2001). 
 
 
1.2   Motivations and contributions of the study 
 
Many studies have focused on management incentives to revalue assets, but little attention 
has been paid to the usefulness of fixed asset revaluation information from users‟ perspective. 
According to Emanuel (1989, p 213), “regardless of the motivation...it has been commonly 
argued that current values are more useful for investment and managerial decision-making 
than historical cost based numbers”. 
  
 
Fixed asset revaluation as part of the current cost accounting should be useful to decision 
makers. Several studies have been conducted in the past with the aim of determining the 
effect of the fair value (current cost) accounting information has on the decision making 
process of investors. Duncan and Moores (1988) conducted a study in New Zealand to test 
whether current cost accounting (CCA) information is useful for investor decision making. 
They use a post-test, control group design in their study and their study results showed that 
CCA information offer more relevant information for investor decision-making. Carroll and 
Linsmeier (1997) investigated the relationship between the fair value accounting information 
and the stock price. In their study, a sample of 143 closed-end mutual funds during 1983-
1997 was selected to examine the relevance of fair value accounting to investors. Evidence in 
their study indicated a significant correlation between fair value of investments and stock 
prices, after controlling for historical costs. Hence, if fixed asset revaluation information is 
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useful one would expect to see a relationship between asset revaluation information and the 
share price movements of the firm.  
 
 
While valid and justifiable reasons exist for fixed-asset revaluation by publicly-traded firms, 
asset revaluation may be undertaken by some firms on an opportunistic basis to bring 
maximal benefits to their firms (Standish and Ung, 1982). The reliability of the financial 
statements will be impaired and the users of the financial reports will be misled if the 
revaluation policy is selected due to the managerial self-interest (Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik, 
1999).  
 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted to investigate the underlying motivations of the 
management for asset revaluations (see Whittred and Zimmer, 1986; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990; Brown et al., 1992; Whittred and Chan, 1992; Easton et al., 1993; Cotter, 1999; Lin and 
Peasnell, 2000a; Lin and Peasnell, 2000b). For example, Whittred and Zimmer (1986) 
demonstrated that management may have incentive to inflate assets to avoid being in 
technical default of its debt agreement whereas Cotter (1999) examined whether Australian 
firms revalue their assets to reduce debt contracting costs in the current institutional setting 
and his results showed that asset revaluation decisions of the firms are no longer related to the 
incentives to reduce the probability of default on debt covenants. Despite these, New 
Zealand-specific research regarding fixed asset revaluation practice remains very limited. 
 
 
Firms could initiate upward fixed-asset revaluations to generate additional borrowing 
capacity in situations where management is aware that financial-leverage positions likely will 
preclude future borrowing (Brown et al., 1992; Cotter, 1999; Lin and Peasnell, 2000b). Lin 
and Peasnell (2000a) argue that the existence of slender cash resources would restrict a firm‟s 
investment opportunities. Hence, “revaluations can provide relief by providing more up to 
date information on cash that could be raised from selling the assets and thereby enhancing 
borrowing capacity” (p369). The study by Lin and Peasnell includes 1989 and 1991 sample 
and this does not reflect current practice. Accounting regulation and trends have changed 
significantly since the late 1990s. It is unclear whether the factors that motivated revaluations 
have persisted over time.  
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Upward asset revaluations could be used as a means to provide credible signal of the 
undervaluation of the assets and indication of better prospects of the firms (Aboody et al., 
1999; Gaeremynch and Veugelers, 1999). Hence, revaluations may be conducted by some 
asset-rich firms with poor earning to distinguish themselves from unprofitable firms (Lin and 
Peasnell, 2000a).  
 
 
Cotter and Zimmer (1995) examined the additional factors associated with revaluation 
practices of Australian firms from 1980-1984. Using a sample of 100 firms randomly selected 
from data supplied by Whittred and Chan (1992), the authors found that asset revaluations are 
associated with the increasing levels of secured debt. The authors also found a relationship 
between the declining cash flow and asset revaluations, leading to the conclusion that (1) 
firms undertake revaluations to signal borrowing capacity to the lenders, and (2) the revaluers 
are more likely to be experiencing declining cash flows from operations than non-revaluers. 
 
1.3   Purpose of the Study 
 
There is a lack of relevant research of fixed assets revaluation practices in New Zealand. This 
study provides some insights as (1) why some New Zealand firms choose to revalue their 
fixed assets; (2) when will a firm revalue its fixed assets; and (3) whether fixed asset 
revaluation provides information to investors. This research attempts to explain the 
motivations of the management‟s fixed asset revaluation decision in New Zealand. To 
accomplish this objective, this study focuses on New Zealand‟s firms and adopts the research 
framework used in Lin and Peasnell‟s (2000a) study. The empirical analysis includes five 
common explanatory variables, such as gearing (debt-equity ratio), liquidity, market-to-book 
ratio, firm size, and fixed asset intensity. Equity depletion is excluded from the study 
although it was part of Lin and Peasnell (2000a) study. The reason for this is that Lin and 
Peasnell‟s study looked at revaluation at a time when firms in Britain were required to treat 
goodwill in accordance with FRS 10.  Their sample consisted of firms drawn from 1989 and 
1991 sample. At that time the common but controversial practice was for firms to write off 
purchased goodwill to equity reserves directly. Post 2001, the IFRS was introduced and the 
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prescriptions for treating goodwill changed significantly. Goodwill is currently not capitalised 
and amortised as was done under FRS 10 in 1989 and 1991.  
 
In addition, the relationship between asset revaluation and share price movements of the 
firms would be examined to determine the perceived usefulness of fixed asset revaluation 
information for the capital market in New Zealand. To accomplish this objective, this study 
adopts the research framework used in Sharpe and Walker‟s (1975) study.  
 
 
1.4   Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
The research questions and hypotheses are given as follows: 
 
1.4.1 Management Incentives 
 
Research Question One 
What is the relationship between fixed-asset revaluation and the gearing of the 
publicly traded firms in New Zealand?  
Hypothesis One 
H1: Fixed-asset revaluation is positively related to a firm‟s debt-equity ratio. 
Research Question Two 
What is the relationship between fixed-asset revaluation and liquidity of publicly 
traded firms in New Zealand?  
Hypothesis Two 
H2: Fixed-asset revaluation is negatively related to the liquidity of a firm.   
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Research Question Three 
What is the relationship between fixed-asset revaluation announcements and market-
to-book ratios of publicly traded firms in New Zealand? 
Hypothesis Three 
H3: Fixed-asset revaluation is positively associated with the market-to-book 
ratio of a firm. 
 
Research Question Four 
What is the relationship between fixed-asset revaluation and the size of the publicly 
traded firms in New Zealand?  
Hypothesis Four 
H4: Fixed-asset revaluation is positively related to the size of a firm. 
 
 
Research Question Five 
 
What is the relationship between fixed-asset revaluation and the fixed asset intensity 
of the publicly traded firms in New Zealand?  
Hypothesis Five 
H5: Fixed-asset revaluation is positively associated with a firm‟s fixed asset     
intensity. 
 
1.4.2 Market Reaction 
Research Question Six 
What is the relationship between fixed-asset revaluation announcements and share 
price movements of publicly traded firms in New Zealand?  
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Hypothesis Six 
H6: There is a positive relationship between fixed-asset revaluations and share 
price movements. 
 
1.5   Thesis Outline 
 
Chapter Two discusses an overview of the literature relevant to the problems investigated. 
Chapter Three discusses in detail the research hypotheses, the theoretical and empirical model 
and the data. The results and discussion of the research findings are presented in Chapter Four. 
Chapter Five presents a summary of the major findings from the research, the research 
implications, policy inferences, the research limitations, and recommendations for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Fixed asset revaluation has long been a debatable issue. The common argument in accounting 
characterises fair values of assets as being more relevant but less reliable than their historical 
costs. Lawrence and Henry (as cited in Chatfield 1974, p235), both prominent accounting 
theorists in the early 1900s, shared the view that fixed assets should be valued at historical 
cost because they are not intended for sale. Although fixed assets are not held for sale as such, 
investors who buy stocks in the firm actually buy a portion of the assets of the firm in the 
expectation that that portion will generate returns sufficient to compensate them for the risk 
they take. Therefore, it may be important that investors can ascertain the real value of the 
assets of the firm they want to invest in. This will only be possible if historical costs are 
adjusted to represent current underlying asset values. 
 
Whether firms should be allowed to revalue their assets, especially upward revaluation, has 
been fairly discussed in accounting literature. The debate centred on whether firms should 
carry historical costs or fair values in their books. Accounting standards and practices around 
the world are divided on whether upward revaluation of assets should be allowed in the 
accounting books. A number of countries, such as the United States and Canada, do not allow 
upward revaluation of fixed assets. While other countries are allowed, under certain 
conditions, including Australia, Belgium, Spain, France, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Netherlands, India, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Missonier-Piera, 
2007). A recent article reports that there are about 48 countries where upward revaluation of 
noncurrent assets is allowed (Barlev, Fried, Haddad, and  Livnat, 2007).  
 
However, such revaluations are not without costs. Henderson and Goodwin (1992) identify a 
number of such elements which make up the costs of revaluation. These include cost of 
obtaining an estimate of a fair value of the asset in question, higher audit fees and also costs 
involved in terms of the time, and money spent during negotiations. Apart from these direct 
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costs, there are also some other indirect costs that may arise from the decision to revalue 
assets. One of such indirect costs is the impact of the revaluation on the financial statements. 
In terms of its effects on the financial statements, revaluations substantially increase the asset 
base of a firm. If other variables (such as the level of profits) remain constant, management‟s 
performance (measured by the Return on Assets (ROA)) will be perceived to have declined. 
Shareholders or investors interested in smaller firms may be warded off by substantial 
increases in asset values. As the firm grows bigger (increased asset values), the relationship 
between individual shareholders and management increases (Missonier-Piera, 2007). 
 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) faced strong objections when it 
introduced fair value accounting into two non-financial fields: investment property and 
agriculture (Barlev et al., 2007). Because of the strong criticism, the board was compelled to 
allow a dual accounting system using either fair value or historical cost accounting (Barlev et 
al., 2007). The difficulty faced by the IASB in instituting its proposed fair value accounting 
standard reflects how thorny the issue is, and any move to standardise practice across 
countries will invite criticism and obstacles. A number of research papers have explored 
whether such revaluations should be allowed. In their study, Henderson and Goodwin (1992) 
argue against the use of noncurrent asset revaluation on the basis that it is theoretically 
unsound. They also find that the cost of asset revaluations far outweighs any benefits that 
may be obtained from the process. Today, the IASB allows for the adoption of various 
methods of valuation including current replacement cost, net realisable value and historical 
costs (net book values). The emphasis is that whichever method is adopted must be used 
consistently. 
 
2.2 Motives of Fixed Asset Revaluation 
 
In spite of criticisms, fixed assets revaluation is widely carried out in countries such as the 
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Most of the empirical research conducted in 
the area of fixed asset revaluation has used data from these Anglo-Saxon countries to evaluate 
a number of hypotheses. These researches have mostly focused on the motives of carrying 
out asset revaluation.  
 
Two suggestions have been forwarded in past literature as to why revaluation of fixed assets 
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occurs: political cost and debt contracting. According to the Positive Accounting Theory 
(PAT), it is argued that accounting numbers may be used as a means of providing „excuses‟ 
for effecting wealth transfers in the political process (White et al., 1998). Previous research 
also provides evidence that upward asset revaluations are used by firms to avoid the cost 
associated with technical violation of debt covenant (Whittred and Chan, 1992; Brown, et al., 
1992; and Cotter and Zimmer, 1995).  
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Wong (1988), and Deegan and Hallam (1991) reveal that the 
demands by particular interest groups may be affected by the results of the firm. Their studies 
demonstrated that high profits may be caused by an increase of taxes imposed by government 
and it could also be used as a reason for trade unions to demand a pay-rise. In such a case, 
upward revaluation of fixed assets may be used as a tactic to decrease the profit of the firm so 
as to improve the bargain power of the firm with government and trade unions. 
 
Technical violation of accounting-based covenants could be costly. The technical violation of 
the debt covenants could bring adverse impacts to a firm, such as (1) increased interest rates, 
(2) more debt covenants imposed and (3) decreasing the amount the firm is eligible to borrow 
in future (Beneish and Press, 1995). Therefore, asset revaluation may be used as an 
accounting strategy to loosen constraints such as debt-to-equity restrictions. Management 
may have incentive to either inflate assets or deflate liabilities to avoid being in technical 
default of its debt agreement (Whittred and Zimmer, 1986; Christie, 1990).  
 
In broad terms, the motives for practicing fixed asset revaluation can be divided into two 
categories: Management incentives and Market reactions. These two broad types of motives 
are explained in the next section.  
 
2.2.1 Management Incentives 
 
2.2.1.1 Major Studies on Management Incentives 
A number of factors have been put forward in the empirical literature to explain managerial 
motives of doing a fixed asset revaluation. A summary of these empirical findings is shown in 
Table 2.1 below. 
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Table 2.1: A summary of empirical findings on management incentives for asset revaluation 
Study Country Data Period Evidence 
Motivating Factors Non-Motivating Factors 
Whittred and Chan (1992) Australia 1980-84 
 Debt Covenants 
 Leverage 
 Investment Opportunities 
 Low Cash Reserves 
 
Brown et al. (1992) Australia 1974-77; 1984-86 
 High Leverage & covenant violation 
 Political Cost (Size) 
 Information Asymmetry; Signalling 
 Defence for takeover bid  
 
Cotter and Zimmer (1995) Australia 1980-84 
 Negative cash flows 
 Secured Borrowings 
 
Black, Sellers, and Manly (1998) UK, Australia, New Zealand 1985-95 
 Leverage 
 Book-to-equity ratios 
 Liquidity 
 
Gaeremynck and Veugelers 
(1999) 
Belgium 1989-94 
 Debt Covenants 
 Lower Net Worth 
 Financial Assets 
Cotter (1999) Australia 1993-95 
 Level of revaluations have gone down due to shift in debt 
market and legislature requirements 
 Debt Covenants 
Lin and Peasnell (2000a) UK 1989; 1991 
 Equity Depletion 
 Size and Leverage   
 Fixed Asset intensity 
 
Lin and Peasnell (2000b) UK 1983  Size and Leverage    
Jaggi and Tsui (2001) Hong Kong 1991-95 
 Signalling  Debt Covenants 
Missonier-Piera (2007) Switzerland 
1994; 1997; 2000; 
2004 
 Debt Covenants 
 Signalling 
 International Stakeholders 
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One of the first research papers that discuss management‟s incentives for fixed asset 
revaluations is Brown et al. (1992). The authors examine the revaluation decisions in 
Australia and their results show that larger firms which (a) report a high profit, or (b) face a 
takeover or likelihood of labour strike threat, will have greater incentives to undertake an 
upward revaluation of their assets.  
Using a sample size of 204 and 206 firms listed on the Industrial Board of the Australian 
Associated Stock Exchanges for the period 1974-77 (higher inflation) and 1984-86 (lower 
inflation) respectively, Brown et al. (1992) explore a number of hypotheses related to fixed 
asset revaluation. The authors examine and evaluate a number of managerial motivations for 
asset revaluations including contracting costs, political costs, information asymmetry, 
financial slack, bonus issue, and defence against takeover. Since the revaluation of assets 
changes the accounting number of the firms, their study hypothesises that firms with higher 
debt to equity ratio are more likely to revalue their assets. Similarly, a firm having debt 
covenants is more likely to revalue than firms without such covenants. This hypothesis 
captures the contracting motivation of firm managers.  
Brown et al. (1992) also examine political costs as a motivation for managers to undertake 
asset revaluations. The authors find that larger firms will revalue more frequently than 
smaller firms. The hypothesis stems from the fact that larger firms with huge profits are more 
likely to be noticed by regulators and pressure groups that might have the power to reallocate 
resources from such large firms. Huge profits/returns are usually associated with demands for 
higher taxes and/or other restrictions from these pressure groups (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978). Increasing assets would help firms to reduce the rate of returns. Ball and Foster (1982) 
regard the size as a noisy proxy for political costs and use industries prone to strikes as a 
further proxy for political costs and they find that firms in strike-prone industries are more 
likely to revalue their assets than firms in other industries. Industries prone to strikes are coal 
mining, waterfront, metal trades, and building and construction (Perry, 1979).  
In a seminal paper Myers and Majluf (1984) find that firms can take up positive NPV projects 
in spite of information asymmetry if the firm has enough financial slack (cash, marketable 
securities, borrowing reserve). Financial slack such as borrowing reserve can be created 
through asset revaluation as it decreases debt equity ratio. Brown et al. (1992) find that firms, 
which have not undergone asset revaluation is more likely to revalue in the very near future. 
Since property values are more likely to be correlated with inflationary change, Brown et al. 
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(1992) find that firms are more likely to revalue property than plant and equipment. 
Furthermore, their results show that a firm is more likely to revalue when it has lower holding 
of cash and other marketable securities compared to total assets (so as to increase financial 
slack). Casey and Eddey (1986) argue that a common defence against takeover bid is to 
revalue assets and signal the true value of the firm to its shareholders. Using this argument, 
Brown et al. (1992) find that a firm with a threat of takeover is more likely to revalue its 
assets than firms without such threats.  
Results from Brown et al.‟s (1992) study show that firms with high leverage revalue more 
frequently than firms with low leverage. Similarly, firms closer to violating their debt 
covenants revalue more frequently than other firms. Supporting the political cost hypothesis, 
their results also show that larger firms revalue more frequently than smaller firms. Moreover, 
in the first period of 1974-1977, firms that were prone to strikes revalued more frequently 
than those in other industries, again confirming the political cost hypothesis. Thus, their 
results support the proposition that asset revaluation helps in lowering the probability of 
wealth transfers from contracting and political costs. Brown et al.‟s (1992) study also support 
the information asymmetry and signalling hypothesis as evidence shows that firms with lower 
financial slack revalue more frequently than firms with higher financial slack. Asset 
revaluation as a defence for takeover bid also finds support in the evidence. The analysis 
shows that there are a number of motivations that drive asset revaluation and these 
motivations are different for different firms. The motivation for asset revaluation for a high 
leveraged firm is different for a low leveraged firm although both of them might be involved 
in asset revaluation.   
Whittred and Chan (1992) also find evidence similar to Brown et al. (1992). They use a 
sample of 428 Australian firms (129 revalued firms and 299 non-revalue firm) during the 
period 1980-84. The authors argue that the problem of underinvestment, as discussed by 
Myers and Majluf (1984), can be solved in an inexpensive manner through asset revaluations. 
The problem of underinvestment is exacerbated by covenants based on accounting numbers 
since certain covenants restrict the firm from making further borrowings and therefore 
rejecting positive NPV projects (Courtenay and Cahan, 2004). Whittred and Chan, (1992) 
argue that while additional borrowings can be made through negotiations with the bank, a 
less costly approach would be to revalue the assets as it would avoid going through the pain 
of negotiations. The underinvestment problem can be alleviated this way with the relaxation 
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of debt covenants.  
Results from Whittred and Chan‟s (1992) data show that there is a strong relationship 
between revaluation of assets and the existence of debt covenants, leverage, investment 
opportunities available and cash reserves. The authors find that revaluation is carried out by 
Australian firms to increase their borrowing capacity so as to invest in positive NPV projects, 
thereby alleviating any underinvestment problem.  
Gaeremynck and Veugelers (1999) create a theoretical model of asset revaluation and 
present some empirical evidence from Belgium regarding managerial motivations on asset 
revaluations. Using an analytical model, the authors examine the signalling motivation of 
managers in an environment where the probability of raising funds not only depends on the 
expected future prospects of its projects but also on its existing financial position. 
Revaluation decreases the expected costs of reorganisation since a decision not to revalue 
may increase the leverage of a firm (debt to asset or equity ratio) leading to violations of its 
debt covenants. However, the decision not to revalue its assets increases the probability of 
receiving additional funds because it signals it will be more successful (without resorting to 
revaluation). The authors show that a separating equilibrium can be achieved only when 
successful firms do not revalue because the expected cost of reorganisation is smaller than the 
additional benefits received from additional funding. Gaeremynck and Veugelers (1999), 
however, contend that such strategy is not favourable in all circumstances. The strategy that is 
most favourable is those industries which are characterised by high variance in performance 
and low equity to debt ratio.  
Gaeremynck and Veugelers (1999) use empirical data comprises 1,036 observations (189 
revaluations and 847 non-revaluations) selected from those firms that were not listed on the 
Belgian Stock Exchange during the 1989-94 period. They find that, as a credible signal of the 
firm quality, successful firms in industries characterised by high performance variance and 
low equity to debt ratio, avoid revaluing their assets. Their results also show that the amount 
of revaluation (i.e. Revalued amount as a percentage of capital) does not affect the decision to 
revalue or not. Supporting the evidence of earlier studies, the authors also find evidence of 
firms being engaged in revaluation when they are close to violating debt covenants and when 
their net worth becomes lower. Their results also provide evidence that revaluation of 
financial assets does not provide any information on future cash flows.    
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Cotter and Zimmer (1995) examine some of the issues that were not explored by earlier 
researchers. The authors are concerned with the large number of independent revaluations 
carried out by firms where there are no restrictions. Furthermore, while independent 
revaluations are required in order to make the balance sheet more attractive, the widespread 
use of directors‟ revaluation in financial statements also made the authors think about the 
motivation of such revaluations. The authors also question leverage as the only criteria for 
receiving additional funds and determining the borrowing capacity of firms. They posit that 
borrowing capacity also depends on lenders‟ assessment of the firm‟s ability to repay debt. In 
addition, the authors state that it is the cash flow from operations rather than the cash flow 
from investing and financing that affects the borrowing capacity of firms. In view of all these 
issues Cotter and Zimmer (1995) posit a number of hypotheses: (a) firms undertaking a 
revaluation are more likely to experience declining cash flow from operations than other 
firms; (b) the relation between cash flow from operations and asset revaluation is stronger 
when the firm is highly leveraged; (c) firms undertaking a revaluation are more likely to 
increase their levels of secured borrowings than firms that do not revalue; (d) revaluations 
made by directors are more likely to be recorded in the accounts at financial year end than at 
other times of the year; and (e) revaluations recorded in the accounts at dates other than 
financial year end are more likely to be made by independent valuers.  
 
Cotter and Zimmer (1995) use 100 firms from Whittred and Chan‟s (1992) study. Their study 
find support for most of the hypotheses. The authors‟ results support the hypothesis that firms 
undertaking revaluation are more likely to experience negative cash flows than firms which 
did not revalue. The revaluation is most likely to occur in the year of decreasing cash flow 
while firms experiencing increase in cash flow do not revalue. Moreover, this relationship is 
even stronger in case of firms with high leverage. Evidence also shows that an increase in 
secured borrowing is accompanied by asset revaluations. With respect to the source of 
revaluation, evidence suggests most of the directors‟ revaluations are recorded at the end of 
the year while most non year-end revaluations come directly from contracting with lenders 
which require independent valuation.       
 
Black, Sellers, and Manly (1998) extend the evidence on asset revaluation in the context of 
the UK, Australia, and New Zealand. The authors also examine whether firms are engaged in 
earnings management through sale of revalued fixed assets. Using a sample of 696 firm-year 
observations from the UK and 503 firm-year observations from a combined sample for 
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Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) during the period 1985-1995, the authors examine 
whether revaluers and non-revaluers differ in terms of debt equity ratios, market-to-book 
ratios or liquidity ratios. The result suggests that revaluers are larger and have more market 
capitalisation than non-revaluers, at least in ANZ. Consistent with prior work, evidence from 
the analysis of the data suggests that both in the UK and ANZ revaluers are much different to 
non-revaluers in terms of leverage, book-to-equity ratios and liquidity. While the leverage of 
revaluers is much higher than non-revaluers, the liquidity is much lower. The authors‟ result 
did not show any evidence of income smoothing behaviour by firms through the sale of 
revalued assets. Sales of revalued assets occur primarily because of sound investment and 
production reasons.  
 
Cotter (1999), using a sample of Australian firms, presents recent evidence on the 
motivations of asset revaluations. The author argues that in spite of earlier evidence available 
on motivations of asset revaluation it is necessary to provide fresh evidence on account of a 
number of changes in institutional settings. The author points to increased regulation of asset 
revaluation and disclosures, changes in microenvironment and changes in the Australian debt 
market as justification to provide fresh evidence on asset revaluation motivations. Primarily 
Cotter (1999) strives to find out whether debt contractions motivations still remain strong for 
asset revaluations in the changed environment.   
 
Cotter uses a sample of 485 firm-years consisting of 171 firms listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange during the 1993-1995 periods. The data suggests that most of the revaluations are 
for land and buildings while about 14 percent of the revaluation comprises that of plant and 
equipment and investments. A number of revaluations were not made in the accounting books 
but disclosed in the footnotes. In regards to source of valuation, almost half of them come 
from independent valuers while the remainder come from a combination of directors and 
independent valuers and directors‟ revaluation. The increase in valuation, however, represents 
only a small percentage of the total assets and therefore does not make a significant 
improvement in the debt equity ratios. More importantly, the data suggests that a smaller 
number of firms engaged in revaluation in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. In addition, the 
increment in value is not significant. While Whittred and Chan‟s (1992) sample shows a 
mean of about 7.73 percent increase in asset value through revaluation, the mean increase in 
Cotter ‟s (1999) sample is only 4.7 percent.  
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The data analysis suggests that motivation to increase the borrowing capacity or the 
proximity of violating debt covenants is no longer related to asset revaluations. The 
significant change during the period is the shift in the way firms fund themselves: moving 
from public to private debt and with strong relationship with banks. The author states that the 
need for revaluation has decreased with the dramatic increased in private debt through closer 
relationships with banks. Instead of carrying out an asset revaluation most firms disclose 
through footnotes, which also is less costly compared to revaluation done by independent 
valuers. The results received additional support from the series of interviews that the author 
conducts with chief financial officers of a number of firms. Besides the shift in debt source, 
lower inflation and changes in legislation requiring the firms to obtain asset revaluation every 
three years are also reasons the author advances for the decline in asset revaluation by firms. 
The result is quite a departure from earlier studies and calls for new evidence from all 
countries where asset revaluation is permitted in the books of account.  
 
Using large samples from 1989 and 1991 of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, Lin 
and Peasnell (2000a) examine the relationship between contracting, signalling, and political 
environments and asset revaluation. They examine whether asset revaluation is used to fill 
„equity depletion‟ brought about by implementation of the UK accounting method, which 
requires firms to write off goodwill purchases to equity reserves. The selection of the two 
years (1989 and 1991) helps the authors to examine whether firms store undisclosed 
revaluation reserves during periods of economic boom (1989) and report them during periods 
of economic downturn (1991). The authors use a sample of 1,106 firms for 1989 and 1,083 
firms for 1991.  
 
Lin and Peasnell‟s results suggest that equity depletion is strongly related to asset revaluation. 
Furthermore, asset revaluation is also positively related to size, gearing and fixed asset 
intensity of the firm while negatively related to liquidity. The authors‟ result support the 
contracting hypothesis and show that equity depletion, quick assets and size are important 
factors in determining when a particular firm revalues its assets.  
 
Using a costly contracting framework, Lin and Peasnell (2000b) examine asset revaluation 
and Current Cost Accounting (CCA) disclosure decisions of UK firms in 1983. As a result of 
high inflation in the early 1970s and demand for a current value or constant price accounting 
system, the Current Cost Accounting standard (SSAP 16) was introduced in 1980 in the UK. 
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The standard was suspended in 1985 and withdrawn in 1988 making it a purely voluntary 
exercise for firms thereafter. The authors use this period (when the standard was introduced) 
to examine, apart from factors affecting revaluation of assets, whether asset revaluation and 
CCA were part of the same coin to meet the same end. In line with results from earlier studies, 
the authors use a sample of 474 firms included in the Financial Times Actuaries All Share 
(FTA) index in 1983, find evidence of asset revaluation positively related to size and gearing. 
The authors attribute this relationship to political cost and debt contracting motivations of 
managers. However, their results did not find any evidence of the connection between asset 
revaluation and compliance with CCA standards. That is, they are not the means to achieve 
the same goals.    
 
Jaggi and Tsui (2001) provide evidence of managers‟ motivation for upward asset 
revaluation from Hong Kong. The study uses a sample of 481 firm-year observation during 
the period 1991-95 drawn from the EXTEL database of Financial Times Information. The 
authors result show that the most important motivation for asset revaluation is the signalling 
of the fair value of the asset to investors. This comes from the strong positive relationship 
between revaluation and future operating income. Their results also reveal the alignment of 
the investors‟ and managers‟ assessment of asset values. They, however, fail to find evidence 
for one of the main motivations that has been described in the literature: debt covenant 
violation. However, they did find evidence of asset revaluation related to managers‟ increase 
borrowing capacity. Their results show a relationship between share price increase and asset 
revaluation. They also present evidence in a setting where firms are mostly owned and 
controlled by family and indicate that revaluation is considered value relevant by the 
investors.   
 
Missonier-Piera (2007) presents evidence of economic motivations for asset revaluations of 
Swiss managers. Investigation of asset revaluation in Switzerland becomes interesting for a 
number of reasons: firms in Switzerland use international accounting standards; international 
stakeholders are important to Swiss firms as a number of Swiss firms rely on international 
investors and customers and therefore provides the opportunity to examine the influence of 
international stakeholders on the choice of accounting treatment; and the Swiss stock 
exchange is relatively illiquid and resembles more of a bank oriented market. Missonier-Piera 
postulates a number of hypotheses on upward asset revaluation related to debt costs, needs of 
international stakeholders, managers‟ compensation, leverage ratio, level of export sales, and 
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ownership diffusion (control). In order to capture the significant accounting changes, the 
author utilises data of year 1994, 1997, 2000, and 2004.  
 
Using pooled and cross regression analysis, the author finds firms conducting asset 
revaluation with more leverage and fewer investment opportunities. Reducing the likelihood 
of violating debt covenants and signalling the increased borrowing capacity seems to be the 
primary motivation of Swiss managers to revalue their assets. Missonier-Piera also finds 
evidence of export sales with revaluation of assets with the manager‟s assumption of 
increased creditworthiness as important for foreign stakeholders.  
 
2.2.1.2  Conclusion on Management Incentives 
The discussion of the above studies reveals that a number of factors have been put forward by 
researchers to explain the motivation of managers to undertake upward fixed asset 
revaluations. The major factors that affect revaluation can be summarised as: leverage, 
increased borrowing capacity, debt covenants, declining operating cash flows, size and strike 
prone industries, low liquidity, depletion of equity, growth prospects, defence against 
takeover bid. However, not all factors are important at one point in time or for all firms. 
While some factors might be more important for some firms than others, the same factors 
again might not be important at other times. Cotter‟s (1999) study lends support to the 
argument that even though some factors have remained influential over time, a number of 
other factors which were considered important during the 1970s and 1980s are no longer 
important. It therefore becomes important to re-examine these factors in the light of recent 
data and new standards and regulations to bring to light the most important factors affecting 
asset revaluation. 
 
2.2.2 Market Reactions  
2.2.2.1  Market Reactions to Asset Revaluation 
Asset revaluation will affect accounting numbers, which in turn alters financial statements. If 
asset revaluation information is useful for investors‟ decision-making, one would expect to 
see a relationship between asset revaluation and share prices. Previous studies (Sharpe and 
Walker, 1975; Standish and Ung, 1982; Emanuel, 1989 and Easton et al., 1993) showed mix 
results regarding the impact of revaluations on share prices. 
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A number of research papers have investigated the impact of upward fixed asset revaluation 
by examining the relationship between asset revaluation and movements in the share price. A 
summary of the studies is presented in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: A summary of empirical findings on market reactions to asset revaluation 
Study 
Country Data Period Evidence 
Sharpe and Walker (1975) Australia 1960-70 
 Revaluation announcements being regarded as informative by the investors and that such 
information is quickly absorbed into the security prices 
Standish and Ung (1982) UK 1964-73 
 Positive unexpected returns for firms which announced fixed asset revaluation 
 Fixed asset revaluations are taken by the market as pointers to some other benefits to the 
shareholders 
Emanuel (1989) NZ 1970-79 
 Results fail to show any relationship between asset revaluations and revisions in share prices 
 Asset revaluation as a pure accounting artefact. 
Easton, Eddey, and Harris, (1993) Australia 1981-91 
 Strong relationship between stock price returns and revaluation for firms with high debt equity 
ratio 
Bernard (1993) Australia 1981-1999 
 A re-examination, confirmation and discussion of Easton et al. (1993) 
 Puts forward the efficient contracting hypothesis  
Barth and Clinch (1998) Australia 1991-95 
 Revaluation of operational assets, such as PPE, are more value relevant than those assets which 
are not directly related to operations 
Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik  (1999)  UK 1983-95 
 Strong positive relationship between asset revaluation and future performance one, two and 
three years after the revaluation 
 Weak relationship between asset revaluation and share price and future performance for firms 
with high debt to equity ratios 
O’Hanlon,and Pope (1999) UK 1972-1992  Only value relevant flow is the ordinary profit 
Cahan, Courtenay, Gronnewoller & Upton, (2000)  NZ 1992-97 
 Only the comprehensive income having any relevance to value and that there is no value 
addition from segregating the components of income 
Courtenay and Cahan (2004) NZ 1992-96 
 Asset revaluations are significantly and positively related to stock returns 
 Firms having higher levels of debt do not experience stock price appreciation as firms having 
lower debt do 
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One of the earliest studies on asset revaluation is by Sharpe and Walker (1975). Sharpe 
and Walker‟s (1975) study provides some evidence of changes in accounting method 
(asset revaluation), which are associated with shifts in stock prices. Their study utilises a 
sample of 35 revaluation announcements of Australian firms during the period 1960-1970. 
They find evidence of revaluation announcements as being regarded as informative by 
the investors and that such information is quickly absorbed into the security prices. They 
did not find any evidence of such revaluation announcements being associated with 
systematic changes in the volatility of stock‟s return relative to the market. The validity of 
Sharpe and Walker‟s (1975) study was later questioned by Brown and Finn (1980) on the 
basis that in about 75 percent of the cases were other announcements such as increased 
earnings, dividends and stock dividends.     
 
Using data during the period 1964-1973, Standish and Ung (1982) evaluate the market 
reaction to asset revaluation in the UK prior to the pronouncement of the UK GAAP for 
asset revaluation. Standish and Ung (1982) use the Capital Asset Pricing model (CAPM) 
in analysing data from 232 listed British firms. Their results show that, on average, there 
are positive unexpected returns for firms which announced fixed asset revaluation. In 
order to separate out the effects of announcement of fixed asset revaluation with other 
announcements, Standish and Ung (1982) segregate the sample into sub-samples. 
Analysis of the sub-samples indicates that fixed asset revaluations are taken by the 
market as pointers to some other benefits to the shareholders. When those favourable 
benefits occur, there will be significant improvements in stock return. However, when 
those expected favourable benefits do not occur, then there is an absence of unexpected 
returns. The authors argue that revaluations are used by the managers as tools to influence 
the capital market expectations about their firms.  
 
Emanuel (1989) provides evidence of the impact of material fixed asset revaluation on 
the share price. Emanuel uses 143 material asset revaluations during the period 1970-
1979. The author notes that asset revaluation is a common practice in New Zealand as 
almost 90 percent of the firms listed on the stock exchange carry out revaluations at some 
time or the other. The results fail to show any relationship between asset revaluations and 
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revisions in share prices. While there is some price reaction exactly at the time of 
announcement (time zero), the author finds it difficult to attribute it to asset revaluation as 
there could be a range of other factors that could have impacted the share price with the 
publication of annual report (asset revaluations are normally shown in annual reports). 
The further the data was tested the more difficult it became to attribute any price increase 
to asset revaluations. The author regards asset revaluation as a pure accounting artefact.  
  
Easton et al. (1993) examine the impact of asset revaluation on shares. The authors use a 
number of tools including a survey of chief financial officers and a test of association 
between hand collected data and stock returns to evaluate the impact of noncurrent asset 
revaluation. Their analysis is carried out on Australian data spanning a ten year period 
(1981-1991). Their sample of firms consists of 72 industrial firms and 28 mining firms. A 
telephone survey was conducted with the chief financial officers of 59 industrial and 21 
mining firms. The findings from the survey reveal that the most important reason for 
asset revaluation was to lower the debt equity ratio. Results from the analysis of price to 
book models and return models show weak explanatory power of fixed asset revaluation 
for returns over income and changes in income. They, however, find strong relationship 
between stock price returns and revaluation for firms with high debt equity ratio. The 
authors argue that revalued book value of assets is more aligned with the market value of 
the firm than in firms without such revaluations.  In a discussion paper by Easton et al. 
(1993), Bernard (1993) puts forward the efficient contracting hypothesis where 
revaluations may be used to justify increased borrowing and therefore benefit the firm as 
well as the lender.  
          
Aboody et al. (1999) present a comprehensive analysis of the impact of upward asset 
revaluation on future performance of the United Kingdom (UK). Using data on more than 
5,000 firms during the period 1983-1995, the authors show that revaluation of noncurrent 
assets is common in the UK as 58.9% of the firms during the period have a non-zero 
revaluation balance. The authors argue that the relationship between asset revaluation and 
share price returns only provides indirect evidence of value relevance of asset revaluation 
as share price returns are also influenced by the firm‟s financing and investment decisions. 
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They regard the evidence of the relation between asset revaluation and future firm 
performance in terms of operating income and cash flow from operations as direct 
evidence of the value-relevance of asset revaluation. 
 
Controlling for current changes in performance, risk and growth, Aboody et al. (1999)  
find strong positive relationship between asset revaluation and future performance one, 
two, and three year after the revaluation. The authors‟ results show some relation between 
asset revaluation and share price performance. Moreover, current year revaluations are 
positively related with share price performance. However, they find weaker relationship 
between asset revaluation and share price and future performance for firms with high 
debt to equity ratios than for firms with low debt equity ratios. The authors argue that the 
market participants regard upward revaluations as high debt equity firms as being 
opportunistic, therefore the negative relationship between the two variables. This is in 
contrast to the evidence found by Easton et al. (1993) whereby the relationship is found 
only in cases of firms having high debt equity ratios. Aboody et al. (1999) does not find 
strong relationship between revaluation and future performance/share price returns in 
case of cross listed firms. The authors, however, find strong relationship between 
revaluation and future performance/stock returns in periods of consistently increasing 
asset values rather than in periods of economic volatility.        
 
Using 810 firm-year observations during the period 1991-1995, Barth and Clinch (1998) 
investigate the extent to which different types of revalued assets are associated with share 
price and non-market based estimate of the firm value in Australian firms. Specifically 
they examine whether relevance, reliability, and timeliness of revalued assets vary 
systematically across asset class or by source or age of the revalued amount. The authors 
result show evidence of value relevance with variations in results in terms of asset types.  
Their results also show that revaluation of operational assets, such as PPE, are more value 
relevant than those assets which are not directly related to operations. There does not 
seem to be any evidence of difference in investors‟ attitudes towards valuation made by 
independent appraisers and those made by directors of the firm. Furthermore, their results 
show that timeliness of valuation for long term assets is not critical.  
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Using 20 years data from 1972-1992 of UK firms, O’Hanlon and Pope (1999) find that 
the only value relevant flow is the ordinary profit. Cahan, Courtenay, Gronnewoller, and 
Upton (2000) argue that one of the reasons for the conflicting results is probably due to 
the use of an aggregate measure of asset revaluation instead of segregating the asset 
revaluation as in the case of Barth and Clinch (1998). 
 
Cahan et al.’s (2000) study shows evidence consistent with Aboody et al. (1999) and 
Barth and Clinch's (1998) findings. Using data from 48 firms, Cahan et al. (2000) 
examine the value relevance of fixed asset revaluations. Their study shows that 
comprehensive income to be more value relevant than net income. Using an approach 
adopted from Stark (1997), they find only the comprehensive income having any 
relevance to value and that there is no value addition from segregating the components of 
income.  Their study is an extension of the work of O'Hanlon and Pope (1999), who did 
not find any evidence of value relevance of asset revaluation.  
 
Courtenay and Cahan (2004) provide further evidence from New Zealand using 235 
firm-year observations from a sample of 48 firms listed on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange over the period 1992-1996. Their study primarily investigates the differential 
reaction of investors to asset revaluations for firms with different debt equity ratios in 
order to identify whether such revaluations are motivated by opportunism (see Brown et 
al., 1992) or contracting/signalling (see Whittred and Chan, 1992).  
Courtenay and Cahan‟s (2004) results show that asset revaluations are significantly and 
positively related to stock returns. Their results also show a negative relationship between 
asset revaluations and the level of debt in a firm. Firms having higher levels of debt do 
not experience stock price appreciation as much as firms having lower levels of debt from 
asset revaluations. This shows that the market discounts information about fixed asset 
revaluation comes from firms with high leverage. Their results also show similar 
relationship when leverage is replaced by financial distress. They attribute this result to 
the opportunistic behaviour of asset revaluation (Aboody et al., 1999). They cautiously 
note the negative relationship between revaluations of intangible assets and share price 
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returns. Owing to a small sample size, they refrain from making conclusions and suggest 
it as an area for further research.  
 
2.2.2.2  Conclusion on Market Reaction 
The above studies of market reaction on asset revaluation do not provide a unanimous 
conclusion. We cannot confidently conclude that that upward revaluation of fixed asset 
will bring about positive change in market prices. We therefore cannot ascertain that asset 
revaluation information is perceived as value relevant by current and potential investors.  
Seemingly, the market‟s reaction depends on a number of factors including leverage and 
the asset being revalued among others. Table 2.2 shows most of the studies were done in 
the early 1990s. Again, there is not much current research evidence on this pertinent issue. 
As discussed earlier, there are about 48 countries which allow asset revaluation. Due to 
significant differences in the legal, ownership and structural framework of these different 
countries, results obtained in one of these countries cannot be generalised easily. 
Nonetheless, studies exploring the impact of asset revaluation on share prices from these 
different countries would contribute significantly to the ongoing debate and to current 
accounting literature.  
 
It is worth noting that accounting regulation has changed significantly in the last two 
decades. The birth of the European Union and the adoption of the IASB‟s International 
Financial Reporting standards are amongst the biggest changes in this area. With a 
change in the legal framework governing the issue - asset revaluations, the institution of 
regulations to improve the quality of reporting, higher information availability brought 
about by the growth in information technology, there is need for a current review of this 
issue. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
 
 
 
This research adopts the method used in Lin and Peasnell‟s (2000a) and Sharpe and 
Walker‟s (1975) studies. We made some adjustments to the method. For example, only 
five explanatory variables (instead of six variables used in Lin and Peasnell‟s (2000a) 
study) are used in this study. The relationship between the five explanatory variables and 
the fixed asset revaluation decision of the NZ firms are investigated in this study, using 
Lin and Peasnell‟s (2000a) model. The research data is collected via DataStream and 
annual reports of NZ listed firms. Following Sharpe and Walker (1975), this study only 
considered fixed assets revaluation in the firms. A supplementary test is performed to 
examine the relationship between asset revaluation and the market reaction.  
 
 
This section consists of four sections: (1) the revaluation profile of NZ firms; (2) the 
factors that influence the revaluation decisions; (3) the samples and variables; and (4) the 
Empirical Model.  
 
 
3.1 Revaluation Profile of Studied Firms 
 
In New Zealand, firms have the option to choose whether to revalue or not to revalue 
their fixed assets. If the firms choose to revalue, they are subject to SSAP 28 or FRS 3, 
which curtails their freedom to time revaluation in the subsequent years. However, given 
the restricted time frame of 3 or 5 years, firms could still choose when to exercise the 
option of revaluation when it will yield greater benefits (Cotter and Zimmer, 1995). 
Similarly, a firm can choose to revalue or not to revalue its fixed assets. Firms could be 
classified as regular revaluers, occasional revaluers, and non-revaluers, as identified in 
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Lin and Peasnell‟s (2000a) study. The regular revaluers are represented by firms that 
present little or inexistent option of deferring revaluation, firms that make out of regular 
revaluation on their current policy. Occasional revaluers are represented by firms that did 
not revalue during the period under analysis, but did so in the previous year. On the other 
hand, non-revaluers are firms that that did not revalue in the studied year and previous 
year. 
 
 
3.2  Factors that Influence Revaluation 
 
From the various revaluation factors that constituted in the discussion of previous studies 
on fixed asset revaluation, this study focuses on five factors as follows: 
 
 
3.2.1 Gearing 
Gearing, or financial leverage, represents the fundamental analysis ratio of a firm‟s 
long term debt to its equity capital. Gearing is directly related to the debt: equity 
ratio. The higher the debt: equity ratio, the higher the level of gearing (Westwood, 
1995). This study considers the various reasons for which gearing can be an 
important factor in the decision a certain firm will make whether to revalue or not 
to revalue its fixed assets.   
 
 
3.2.2 Liquidity 
Liquidity represents the capacity of an asset to be rapidly sold or transform into 
cash (Petty, Keown, Scott, and Martin, 1993). As a proxy for a firm‟s liquidity, the 
quick asset ratio will be used in this study for a better comprehension and the 
analysis of the influence liquidity has on the revaluation decision. Also known as 
“acid test ratio”, the quick asset ratio results from the subtraction of inventories 
from current assets and then divided by current liabilities. The quick asset ratio can 
be viewed as an indicator of a firm‟s financial strength or weakness. Depending on 
 32 | P a g e  
 
the level of liquidity, a firm might decide not to revalue its fixed assets. This is 
because revaluation can offer relief by giving more updated information on the 
amount of cash that would be possible to obtain from the selling of assets, and thus 
improving the borrowing capacity of the firm.  
 
 
3.2.3 Market-to-book Ratio 
The market-to-book ratio can be considered as a signal of possible growth options. 
Debt contracting cannot be assured without a reasonably high proportion of 
tangible assets in the balance sheet. Consequently, a high market-to-book ratio is 
desired for the successful completion of the above mentioned operation, and thus, 
in the case of perceived under-valuation (as indicated by the market-to-book ratio) 
the incentive to upward revaluation will be significantly high (Whittred and Chan, 
1992; Lin and Peasnell, 2000a).  
 
 
3.2.4 Firm Size 
There are various items regarding the size of a firm that could influence the 
decision on revaluating fixed assets. One of them is, the possibly of higher 
incentives that large firms will have – when comparing with smaller ones – to try to 
offer a conservative image on their profitability, due to the higher media and 
government exposure these firms attract (Lin and Peasnell, 2000a). 
 
 
Similarly, the costs involved in the process of revaluation are different from small 
firms to large firms. A critical analysis on how this kind of situations can affect the 
decision of large and small firms to revaluate their assets will be analysed in this 
study too.  
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3.2.5 Fixed Asset Intensity 
The generation of significantly different numbers in the revaluation process is 
conditioned by the stock of fixed assets retained by the chosen firm. The larger the 
stocks of fixed assets in comparison to total assets, the higher the potential for 
revaluation to report a reduced profitability. Depending on a firm‟s interest, a 
decision whether to revalue or not to revalue its assets will be taken into 
consideration (Lin and Peasnell, 2000a). 
 
 
3.3 Samples and Variables  
 
3.3.1 Management Incentives (Research Questions 1 to 5) 
For research questions 1 to 5, the dependant variable is fixed asset revaluation and the 
independent variables are gearing, liquidity, market-to-book ratio, firm size, and fixed 
asset intensity. The firms are drawn from the population of New Zealand firms active in 
industrial and commercial branches that traded shares on New Zealand Stock Exchange 
in 1998 and 2005. By late 2007, New Zealand has had enjoyed its nine years of 
uninterrupted economic growth since its last recession in 1998. It was the longest 
recession-free period since the sustained boom of 1952-1966 (Oram, 2007). Thus, by 
focusing both 1998 and 2005 it is possible to capture two contrasting sets of economic 
conditions in New Zealand. Depending on whether a fixed asset revaluation took place, 
the firms selected have been categorised into two groups, revaluers and non-revaluers.  
  
 
All data are available in the DataStream NZQI including the firms‟ annual reports. Data 
for revaluation firms have been obtained from New Zealand Exchange (NZX). The data 
for research questions 1 to 5 excludes banks, financial institutions, investment trusts and 
property institutions for the reason of either (1) the firms are operating differently from 
ordinary industrial and commercial firms, or (2) the firms do not have many tangible 
assets in their businesses. Additionally, oil and gas and utilities firms are also excluded 
from the studied sample, because the former use specific accounting measurement 
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methods and the latter operate in highly regulated environments, which are significantly 
different from those of ordinary industrial and commercial firms. Thus, incentives for 
fixed asset revaluations may not apply to those firms. 
 
 
The accounting variables are derived from reported results of the analysed year (e.g. for 
firms that use a March financial year-end, the results from 2005 will be extracted from 
the data available for the year ending in March 2005). 
 
 
Following Lin and Peasnell (2000a), sample firms will be divided into four groups to 
answer research questions 1 to 5.  These include: 
 
 
REV group → represents firms that revalued upwards their fixed assets in the analysed 
year; 
 
PRREV group → represents firms that did not revalue their fixed assets in the analysed 
year, but revalued it in the previous two years; 
 
NONREV group → represents firms that did not revalue their fixed assets in either the 
analysed year or in the previous two years; 
 
DOWN group → represents firms that wrote down their fixed assets during the analysed 
year.  
 
 
The reasons in subdividing non-revaluers includes: (1) those previously revalued but not 
revalued in the studied year (PRREV) and (2) those did not revalue in the previous two 
years and the studied year (NONREV) are to address the choice and timing issues. The 
above partition of the firms reflects the discretionary nature of (upward) revaluations. 
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Firms might have the option and not the obligation to do revaluation. The revaluation can 
be considered discretionary from two points of view: first, firms have a choice of whether 
or not to revalue. When and if the first choice is made, the question of the timing follows: 
when will the firm revalue? Therefore, depending on the focus we choose, for example, if 
we consider the choice (revalue or not revalue), we can group PRREV and REV; if we 
decide on the issue of timing (revalue now or revalue in the future), PRREV will be 
grouped with NONREV. Both of these options are addressed in our study, while the issue 
of devaluation, which is not discretionary, will be treated separately (see Lin and Peasnell, 
2000a). Table 3.1 provides a summary of the measurement of the independent variables 
and dependent variable for research questions 1 to 5. 
 
  
Table 3.1: Measurement of variables for research questions 1 to 5 
Variable Measured as 
Independent Variables:  
- Gearing Total debts/Total equity 
- Liquidity  Quick assets/ Current liabilities 
- Market-to-book ratio (Market value of equity + Book value of debt) / 
Book value of equity and debt 
- Firm size Logarithm of sales 
- Fixed asset intensity Net fixed assets/Total assets 
Dependent Variable:  
- Fixed asset revaluation Log-odds of revaluation 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Market Reaction (Research Question 6) 
For research question 6, the two variables of interest are „fixed asset revaluation‟ and 
„share price movement‟. Following Sharpe and Walker (1975), all cases must have 
increased the value of shareholder equity by at least 10% through revaluation. The initial 
sample under investigation constitutes all listed firms on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange between 2001 and 2005 inclusive. However, some cases are finally excluded 
due to data unavailability. 
 
 
This study period is recent and excludes „noise‟ that may have been caused by the global 
financial crisis that started in July 2007. Noise in this case constitutes other factors in the 
 36 | P a g e  
 
external environment (not controlled by the firms in the sample) that may have caused 
significant movements in share prices. This may include falling global demand, rising oil 
prices, falling house prices, falling production, the collapse of major financial 
corporations, etc. 
 
 
New Zealand adopted the IFRS in 2005. The IFRS introduced new principles to govern 
fixed asset revaluation and thus our conclusion will lack robustness if we exclude 2005 
from our analysis. 
 
 
We obtained our data from DataStream NZQI and the firms‟ annual reports. In some 
cases, we cross checked the data obtained from these sources by cross referencing it with 
information available on the firms‟ websites and in the financial press. From the firms‟ 
annual reports, we obtained the firm names, revaluation amounts and year of revaluation. 
We use DataStream to obtain the exact month of revaluation. Following this, we extract 
information on adjusted monthly share prices (price index) for 12 months before this date, 
the event date and 12 months after this date.  
 
 
Price index is used in our study since it is adjusted for other price sensitive information, 
such as dividends, earnings, share splits and inflation. The noise that results from other 
price sensitive information constituted one of the major weaknesses of the Sharpe and 
Walker‟s (1975) study. 
 
 
Data for revaluing firms are obtained from the New Zealand Exchange (NZX). Following 
Sharpe and Walker‟s (1975) study, the data set contains only firms that announced 
material asset revaluations i.e. at least 10% to shareholders‟ fund (shareholders‟ equity).  
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3.4 Empirical Model  
 
 
 
3.4.1 Management Incentives (Research Questions 1 to 5) 
Following Lin and Peasnell (2000a), this study uses logistic regression to examine the 
five factors (independent variables) influencing the revaluation decisions of a sample of 
New Zealand firms in 1998 and 2005.  
 
 
The empirical analysis for research questions 1 to 5 are structured as follows: 
 Model 1 = comparison between REV and NONREV 
 Model 2= comparison between REV and (PRREV+NONREV) 
 Model 3= comparison between (REV+PRREV) and NONREV 
 Model 4= comparison between DOWN and (PRREV+NONREV) 
 
 
Logistic regression analysis has been used as opposed to ordinary least square regression 
analysis because the dependent variable (the decision to revalue or devalue assets in the 
current year) is binary. In each year, the decision of firms to revalue fixed assets can be 
considered as a choice problem where firms must make their selection from the two 
alternatives available (Lin and Peasnell, 2000a). Fixed asset revaluation (dependent 
variable) can assume only two values – a revaluation of fixed assets (1) or no revaluation 
of fixed assets (0). As opposed to ordinary least square regression which estimates its 
coefficients via a least squares method, logistic regression estimates its coefficients 
through maximum likelihood method (Anderson, Sweeney, Williams, Freeman, and 
Shoesmith, 2007).  The dependent variable for each of the above models is the log-odds 
of revaluations. The regression model is defined as follows: 
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yί
*
 = β' χί  + uί (ί = 1, 2, …, n)        (1)  
 
where yί
*  
= underlying latent variable 
yί
  
= 1 if yί
* 
> 0, and yί = 0 if yί
* 
< 0 
χί  = a vector of explanatory variables 
 uί  = an ί. ί. d. random variable with mean 0 
 ί   = firm 
 
The response variable yί
* 
reflects the utility of revaluation for firm ί, which if positive, 
will result in a revaluation (Lin and Peasnell, 2000a, p381). The vector χί includes an 
intercept indicator variable, of which a significant positive (or negative) intercept would 
imply that firms have a bias in favour of (against) revaluation (Griffiths, Hill, and Judge, 
1993).  
 
 
Following Lin and Peasnell (2000a), three separate binomial logit models of upward 
revaluation will be fitted in 1998 and 2005 to reflect different ways of classifying the 
previous revaluers who did not revalue during the studied year (PRREV). Hence, PRREV 
will not be included in Model 1 and will be classified with the non-revaluers in Model 2. 
In Model 3, PRREV will be classified with the current revaluers (Lin and Peasnell, 
2000a). 
 
The standard logistic regression equation to be analysed is given below: 
           (2) 
5544332211
5544332211
1
XBXBXBXBXBA
XBXBXBXBXBA
i
e
e
Y
 
 
where A is a constant and 54321 ,,,, BBBBB  are the coefficient of the independent variables 
i.e. Gearing, Liquidity, Market-to-book ratio, Firm Size and Fixed Asset Intensity 
respectively.     
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The independent variables, gearing, liquidity, market to book ratio, firm size, and 
intensity are computed as shown in Table 3.1. There exists a relationship between Y (the 
dependent variable) and Xi (the independent variable) if the coefficient of Xi, Bi, is 
different from zero. The hypothesis to test the models for significance is given as follows:  
 
Ho: 054321 BBBBB   
H1: 054321 BBBBB  
 
 
The relationship will be significant only if Bi is found to be statistically significantly 
different from zero. 
 
 
3.4.1.1  Obtaining Values for the Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, Y, in our study, models the firm‟s decision to revalue fixed assets. 
The firm can do one of the following: 
 
 Revalued fixed assets in the analysed year 
 Devalued fixed assets in the analysed year 
 Revalued fixed assets in any of the ensuing two years but not the analysed year 
 Not revalue fixed assets in any of the three years 
 
For example, Model 1 compares firms that revalued their fixed assets in the year under 
investigation (1998, 2005) with firms that did not. This comparison is obtained with the 
dependent variables 1 and 0 to indicated REV and NONREV respectively. The same 
analysis is used to structure the other two models. A summary of the models is given in 
Table 3.2 below: 
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Table 3.2: The structuring of Model 1 to Model 4 for 1998 and 2005 
Model  Dummy variable used 
(log-odds of revaluation) 
 Dummy variable used 
(log-odds of revaluation) 
Model 1 REV 1 NONREV 0 
Model 2 REV 1 PRREV & NONREV 0 
Model 3 REV & PRREV 1 NONREV 0 
Model 4 DOWN 1 PRREV & NONREV 0 
 
 
 
3.4.1.2  Measures and Tests: Goodness of Fit, Tests for Significance and 
Strength of Association 
 
 
3.4.1.2.1 Chi Squared 
In this study, the chi squared (also called the -2Log Likelihood) measure will be used to 
measure goodness of fit of both the coefficients and the models. Chi squared is influenced 
by the sample size. With large sample sizes, even a small difference in the -2log 
likelihood of models might be very significant (Anderson et al., 2007, p407). 
 
 
The goodness of fit test (chi squared) focuses on the difference between observed 
frequencies and expected frequencies under the assumption that the null hypothesis is 
true (Anderson et al., 2007, p407). The aim is to determine if the difference between 
observed values and expected values is large enough for us to reject the null hypothesis. 
The chi squared distribution is given as follows: 
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(3) 
        
 
In this study, we use the likelihood ratio chi squared test to test the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients of all independent variables in our model are equal to zero. If we reject 
this hypothesis, we would conclude that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables used in the model. 
 
 
The model chi squared is computed by simply contrasting a model with a constant only 
versus a model with all the independent variables. A value that is significant indicates that 
one or more of the betas (coefficients of independent variables) are different from zero 
but the chi squared measure falls short as it does not indicate which betas are significant 
(Anderson et al., 2007). This computation is efficiently done in this study by using the 
SPSS statistical software. 
 
 
3.4.1.2.2 R Squared 
R squared is a useful measure of fit in statistical modelling. In their study, Shtatland, 
Moore, and Barton (2000) comment that the use of R squared might be prevalent because 
it takes values between 0 and 1. The R squared value becomes increasingly larger and 
approaches 1 as the model fits better. This makes the measure simple, clear and easy to 
interpret. There are several forms of R squared with different merits or predictive abilities. 
 
 
Other studies have employed various test criteria, including McFadden R
2
, Akaike 
Criterion, Schwarz Criterion, the Hannan-Quin Information Criterion, Cox & Snell R 
Squared, Nagelkerke R Squared and Lin‟s Concordance, to test the predictive ability of 
logistic regression models (Lin and Peasnell, 2000a). The suitability of the test criteria 
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would depend on whether the models to be compared are nested or not. The test criteria 
are in some cases used as alternatives although admittedly they have different predictive 
abilities. After observing the merits and demerits of each test, we would employ the Cox 
and Snell R squared and Nagelkerke R squared test in our study to ensure robustness of 
our results.  
 
The Cox and Snell pseudo R square measures the strength of association of a model. The 
strength of association refers to how well the independent variables in the model explain 
the changes in the dependent variable (Shtatland et al., 2000). 
 
The Cox and Snell pseudo R square is based on the log likelihood but takes into account 
the size of the sample. It is given below: 
  (4) 
 
 
 
 
It however falls short as a strong measure of association because its R square doesn‟t 
reach a maximum value of 1. Its use can be supported with the Nagelkerke measure 
which achieves the maximum value of 1. It is empirically given below: 
. 
 
           (5) 
 
 
 
3.4.1.2.3 Likelihood 
The likelihood or deviance measures how bad a model is. Deviance is the probability of 
the observed results given the parameter estimates. -2log likelihood is a standardised 
version of the likelihood. This value measures the extent to which the model fails to 
perfectly predict the values of the independent variable. It indicates the amount of 
2 21 exp [ ( ) (0)]CSR LL B LL
n
2
2 2 1
2
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R
R R n LL
R
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improvement required before the predicting independent variables accurately model the 
dependent variable. A model that fits perfectly has a -2log likelihood of 0 (Anderson et al., 
2007). 
 
 
3.4.1.2.4 The Z or Wald test and P Values 
These measures test individual Predictors (independent variables) for significance by 
statistically verifying whether their coefficients are significantly different from zero 
(Anderson et al., 2007). 
 
The Wald distribution is given below: 
           (6) 
        
 
3.4.1.2.5 Interpreting Coefficients 
We would use P values and Z values or the Wald statistics (Anderson et al., 2007, p601) 
to investigate if the independent variables employed in the study are statistically 
significant. We use a 0.01 level of significance as used by Lin and Peasnell (2000a).  
 
Logistic regression coefficients are interpreted using the Wald or Z test. The formula is 
given below: 
. 
            (7) 
 
 
where SEbj is the Standard Error of Bj. 
 
In this study, the SPSS statistical software will be employed to perform the computations. 
j
j
j
B
B
W
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3.4.2 Market Reaction (Research Question 6) 
This study employs the event study methodology to measure the effect of fixed asset 
revaluation announcements on the firms‟ market value. If an item of relevant information 
is received by stock market participants the market value of a firm is immediately 
readjusted to reflect this new information. This methodology fundamentally assumes that 
the market is at least semi strong form efficient. Semi strong form market efficiency 
implies that all past and current information about a stock is fully incorporated in the 
share price of the stock.  
 
 
Fama (1998) find that apparent under-reaction to information is about as common as 
overreaction. Fama (1998) also find that post event continuation of Abnormal Returns is 
as frequent as post event reversals which indicates that the probability of obtaining 
positive Abnormal Returns after the announcement is equal to the probability of obtaining 
negative Abnormal Returns after the event date. The findings (Fama, 1998) above 
eliminate the incidence of any bias in the movement of share prices on a revaluation 
announcement. This implies any movement of share prices is reflected in the content and 
strength of the information supplied to the market. Event studies are a good approach to 
studying the effect of asset revaluation announcements on share prices. 
 
 
Several models (including the Index model, Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Market 
Model) have been used in past studies to measure the wealth effects of various 
announcements, activities and events on shareholders. These events include the 
announcement of budgets, mergers and acquisitions (takeovers), research and 
development expenditure, appointment/deaths/resignation of chief executives, etc. 
 
 
Following Sharpe and Walker (1975), the study used the market model to examine share 
price movements around the date of revaluations.  The strength of the market model lies 
in its simplicity and effectiveness.  
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The market model states that the return on any security is a function of the return on the 
market portfolio (Rm) and the security‟s responsiveness to the market portfolio, modelled 
by its Beta (Strong, 1992). 
 
 
Beaver (as cited in Strong, 1992) finds that a simple market model allows researchers to 
carry out much more reliable statistical testing. There are other issues or problems 
frequently encountered in event studies, which include the effect of infrequent trading 
and the very disturbing „size effect‟. Dimson and Marsh (1986) and Brown and Warner 
(1985) find that the simple market model helps to resolve the „size effect‟ problem and 
ensures that the effect of infrequent trading is, at best, immaterial to the results obtained. 
Brown and Warner (1985) further test the model under different conditions and they 
conclude that the simple market model performs well when compared to other more 
convoluted models. 
 
 
The market model is mathematically defined as follows (Sharpe and Walker, 1975, pp. 
298): 
 
Rit = α + βi*Rmt + λit (8)  
 
Where 
Rit = the monthly return for firm i in month t  
Rmt = the „market‟ rate of return in month t 
α = a constant, representing the excess return not predicted by the market 
λit = a random error term for month t (this represents any abnormal  
    earnings) 
βi = the systematic risk of firm i  
 
The monthly return for firm i in month t denoted by Rit is computed from the price index 
data: 
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Rit = Log [PIit / PIit-1]       (9) 
where 
PIit-1 is the return index of security i in month t-1 
 
 
The monthly return on the market Rmt is similarly calculated using the following formula: 
 
Rmt = Log [PImt / PImt-1]                 (10)  
where 
PImt-1 is the market index at month t-1 
 
 
Strong (1992) finds that logarithmic returns are analytically more tractable and 
empirically more likely to be normally distributed. This makes the results obtained from 
statistical analysis more reliable.  
 
In this study, we consider the monthly return on New Zealand Government bonds as a 
proxy for our risk free rate of return. Sharpe and Walker (1975) considered a fixed value 
for all observations over different time periods and they acknowledged this as one of the 
weaknesses of their analysis. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to explore 
the relationship between share price movements around the date of the revaluations.  
 
Approximately 60 monthly observations are used to estimate the parameters αt and βi 
excluding 12 observations before and 12 observations after the announcement, with the 
assumption that the responses to asset revaluation would be reflected in share prices 
within this period (Sharpe and Walker, 1975). We therefore have an estimation period of 
35 months and a test period of 25 months.  
 
3.4.2.1  Beta and its Significance 
The beta for each firm is calculated by running a simple linear regression between the 
return index of the firm and the return of the market „proxied‟ by the return on the New 
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Zealand Exchange All Index (NZX All Index). The values for the intercept and gradient 
obtained from the regression in the estimation period were used to calculate the expected 
returns in the test period by using the simple formula: 
 
ER= Intercept + (Gradient* Market Return)               (11) 
 
 
The gradient represents the beta of the stock.  The beta measures the variability or 
relationship between the returns of a firm and the return of the entire market. In other 
words, it shows the correlation between the return of the firm and the return on the 
market. 
 
 
3.4.2.2  Abnormal Returns 
Once the expected return for each firm is computed from the beta, the intercept and the 
market return, the abnormal returns on the stock can be computed. 
 
 
The abnormal returns or residuals constitute the difference between the expected returns 
of a stock and the actual returns. This computation performed for every firm in our 
sample for the test period (that is, month + 12 to month -12). The abnormal returns or 
residuals for firm i in any month t is given by: 
 
iiitit RmR
ˆˆˆ                            (12)  
 
The predicted values of Rit for the excluded months are calculated using the estimated 
value of αt, βi, and known values of Rmt. These predicted values, according to Sharpe 
and Walker (1975), are then subtracted from actual monthly returns in those months to 
obtain residual; λit for month t =-12 to month t = +12. Subsequently, these values are 
averaged across all revaluation cases to produce a series of average residuals. Cumulative 
average residual (CAR) is obtained to see if the market response is sustained over the 
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twelve post-announcement months (Sharpe and Walker, 1975). 
 
 
3.4.2.3  Cumulating Average Residuals 
The average residuals obtained in every month are cumulated to obtain the CAR. The 
CAR thus represents the returns that accrue to each firm due to the event – a revaluation 
announcement. Another method of cumulating average residuals over time is by 
calculating the Abnormal Performance Index (API) of the series. The empirical difference 
between both methods as cited by Strong (1992) is that CAR is more suitable when 
cumulating residuals for a portfolio that is continuously rebalanced while API gives the 
abnormal returns from initially investing equally in each security in a portfolio and 
holding the portfolio over the cumulation period. Following Sharpe and Walker (1975), 
we employ the CAR to cumulate average residuals over the test period. 
 
 
The next chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis. A discussion of the results 
obtained will also follow. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
4.1 Discussion Results for Research Questions 1 to 5 
 
4.1.1 Sample Construction and Analysis 
 
 
Table 4.1 provides details of the sample of New Zealand stocks used in the study. The 
sample in our study falls short when compared to the sample of over 1240 firms in the 
Lin and Peasnell‟s (2000a) study, but our original sample includes every listed firm in 
New Zealand. This therefore ensures that our results are not biased in any way. 
Unfortunately, our sample is further reduced from 135 cases to 39 in 1998 and 198 to 103 
cases in 2005. This is due to unavailability or incompleteness of data in the database in 
some of the cases under investigation. 
 
Table 4.1: The sample under investigation (1998 and 2005) 
 1998 2005 
Firms in Data stream NZ list stock 135 198 
Less: Gov‟t & financial institutions, Oil & gas and utilities firms 2 3 
         Missing Data 94 92 
Final Samples 39 103 
   
 1998 2005 
Devaluers (Down) 4 6 
Current revaluers (REV) 11 24 
Prior revaluers (PRREV) 2 8 
Continuing Non revaluers (NONREV) 22 65 
Total Samples 39 103 
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By relying on our streamlined sample, some trends are noticeable at this stage of the 
analysis.  For example, the data in Table 4.2 shows that there has been a consistent trend 
to not revalue assets. We find that in 1998, over 50% of the firms under investigation had 
not revalued their assets in any of the relevant three years. This trend is again evidenced 
in 2005 as 65 of the 103 firms in the sample do not practice revaluation accounting. There 
is also a slight but noticeable fall in the percentage of firms that devalue their assets over 
the years. This can be attributed to the economic growth that New Zealand achieved since 
1998.  
 
 
Table 4.2: Subsamples under investigation (1998 and 2005) 
Sample         
  1998 % 2005 % 
Devaluers (Down) 4 10% 6 6% 
Current revaluers (REV) 11 28% 24 23% 
Prior revaluers (PRREV) 2 5% 8 8% 
Continuing Non revaluers (NONREV) 22 56% 65 63% 
Total Samples 39 100% 103 100% 
 
Revaluation has been cited as a signal for growth opportunities by management (Lin and 
Peasnell, 2000a). The percentage of firms revaluing their assets in 1998 is slightly higher 
than that of 2005. This observation supports the hypothesis that management may use 
revaluation to signal future growth in companies. 
 
 
4.1.2 Prior Revaluation History 
 
Table 4.3 shows the revaluation history of the firms in our sample. Our results show that 
all (100%) firms which devalued their assets in 1998 had a prior (within the past three 
years) revaluation history. Only 20% of the 2005 devaluers had no prior revaluation 
history. We can conclude that there is a possibility that devaluation was carried out as a 
correction to prior revaluation or over valuation. 
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Table 4.3: Revaluation history of the firms in the subsamples under investigation 
 1998 2005 
 Revalued Previously Revalued Previously 
 Yes No Total Yes No Total 
Devaluers (Down) 4 0 4 5 1 6 
Current revaluers (REV) 10 1 11 22 2 24 
Non revaluers (PRREV+NONREV) 2 22 24 8 65 73 
Total 16 23 39 35 68 103 
 
However, only 10% of the firms that revalued their assets in 1998 and 2005 had no prior 
revaluation history. We again find that most firms which do not revalue their assets (92% 
in 1998 and 89% in 2005) are consistent non revaluers. We can therefore conjecture that 
the firms which revalue their assets today are more likely to revalue them in the future 
and likewise firms which do not revalue their assets today are less like to revalue them in 
the future. 
 
 
4.1.3 Revaluation and Devaluation Amounts  
 
 
In Table 4.4 we investigate the degree or extent to which firms increase or decrease their 
asset values. We realise that in 1998 firms were almost equally likely to revalue their 
assets by any amount. The results show that about 50% of the firms in the sample 
revalued their assets by less than 10% and the rest by more than 20% of their net capital 
employed. However in the same year, fewer firms (25% of devaluers) devalued their 
assets by over 20% of their net capital employed. More devaluers (75%) devalued their 
assets by less than 10% of their net capital employed. In 2005, we find that devaluers 
were more willing to devalue their assets greatly. Over 33% of devaluers devalued their 
assets to more than 20% of their net working capital.  
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Table 4.4: Corporate revaluations amounts as a percentage of net capital employed                                              
  1998   1998   2005   2005   
 Revaluers     Devaluers    Revaluers     Devaluers     
  * ** * ** * ** * ** 
Less than 10% 6 54.5 3 75 10 41.7 3 50 
Between 10% and 
20% 0 0 0 0 5 20.8 1 16.7 
20% or more 5 45.5 1 25 9 37.5 2 33.3 
Total 11 100 4 100 24 100 6 100 
* number of firms 
** in percentage 
 
4.1.4 Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Independent Variables for 1998  
 
Table 4.5 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) for the 
independent variables (size, debt, intensity, liquidity and market to book value ratio) in 
our study for 1998.  
 
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics for independent variables for 1998 
  SIZE DEBT INTENS LIQ MV/BV 
REV group 
   Mean  5.42267 0.244407 0.566968 0.56 2.35272 
   Median 5.146358 0.294523 0.522061 0.53 1.489952 
   Standard deviation 0.292208 0.067043 0.146331 0.151427 0.618366 
PRREV group 
   Mean  5.365001 0.19587 0.384443 0.8375 2.649716 
   Median 5.319496 0.235122 0.400819 0.835 2.649716 
   Standard deviation 0.256669 0.068101 0.075179 0.169183 0.838572 
NONREV group 
   Mean  4.828497 0.286115 0.528952 0.743182 3.38239 
   Median 5.095431 0.281831 0.52371 0.705 2.378871 
   Standard deviation 0.225065 0.042829 0.079772 0.102246 0.78327 
Down group 
   Mean  5.739631 0.37139 0.344713 2.335 5.227967 
   Median 5.739631 0.37139 0.344713 2.335 2.601426 
   Standard deviation 0.120068 0.042277 0.081393 1.415 3.246164 
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4.1.4.1  Firm Size 
Firm size is computed from natural log of sales to allow for standardisation and cross 
comparison. We find that firms with higher sales figures were more likely to devalue their 
assets while firms with the least sales neither revalued nor devalued their assets. This is 
consistent with the results obtained by Missonier-Piera (2007). Missonier-Piera, working 
with a sample of Swiss firms, finds that there is a positive relationship between 
revaluation and proportion of foreign sales. However, the author‟s study does not fully 
investigate the relationship between sales and devaluation. Lin and Peasnell (2000a) find 
the firm size to be positively related to the probability of revaluing or devaluing.  
 
 
Figure 1 shows that high performing firms are more likely to revalue or devalue their 
assets. This means continuous asset revaluation is more common in high performing 
firms. 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between firm size and revaluation for 1998 
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4.1.4.2  Debt 
Surprisingly we find that the sample of New Zealand firms with a higher debt burden 
devalued their assets in the year 1998. In our sample, there is an increasing tendency for 
firms to not revalue upwards as their debt burden increases.  
 
Figure 2: Relationship between gearing and revaluation for 1998 
 
 
The results in Figure 2 differ from the results obtained by previous research investigating 
the relationship between gearing and revaluation. Prior researches including Missonier-
Piera (2007), Cotter and Zimmer (1995), Jaggi and Tsui (2001), Brown et al. (1992) 
amongst others find a strong positive relationship between revaluation and debt 
contracting. The widely held view is that firms with a higher debt burden are more likely 
to revalue their assets to strengthen their balance sheets and give them room to borrow 
more or at least meet existing debt covenants. Cotter (1999) studying a group of 
Australian firms, however, find that due to the relationship with their bankers most 
Australian firms now prefer to disclose undervalued assets as a footnote in their financial 
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highly geared. This variable will be further investigated using regression analysis. 
 
4.1.4.3  Fixed Asset Intensity 
 
Fixed asset intensity represents the proportion of the firm‟s assets that consist of fixed 
assets. A firm can only revalue fixed assets which it possesses. It is thus probable that 
firms with a larger pool of fixed assets are more inclined to continuously revalue or 
devalue them. Our results show that a greater proportion of firms with higher fixed asset 
intensity (that is, higher proportion of fixed assets in their total assets) revalued their 
assets upwards in the year under investigation.  
 
Figure 3 shows that there is a very low tendency for firms with high fixed asset intensity 
to devalue their assets. The result shows that some high fixed asset intensity firms do not 
revalue or devalue their assets. Thus, we deduce that high fixed asset intensity firms 
either revalue upwards or do not revalue their assets at all. The worth of high fixed asset 
intensity firms such as manufacturing and real estate firms is strongly dependent on the 
reported value of their assets. 
 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between fixed asset intensity and revaluation for 1998 
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In our sample, firms with lower fixed asset intensity do devalue their assets. With a low 
proportion of fixed assets in their total assets, these firms may find it less daunting to 
devalue their assets since the effect on their total worth is smaller.  
 
4.1.4.4  Liquidity 
We find that the most liquid firms devalued their assets in the year under investigation 
while the least liquid firms revalued their assets (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Relationship between liquidity and revaluation for 1998 
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4.1.4.5  Market Value to Book Value 
The market to book value ratio of a firm models its growth opportunities and an 
appreciation in the value of assets over time. It shows the amount investors are willing to 
pay over the book value of the assets to hold investments in the firm. A high market value 
to book value ratio may indicate that the book value of fixed assets might have been 
understated. The expectation is that firms with a high market value to book value ratio 
will revalue their assets while firms with a low market value to book value ratio will 
devalue their assets. We find that firms with the highest market value to book value ratio 
rather devalue their assets in the year under investigation (see Figure 5). These results are 
consistent with the findings of Lin and Peasnell (2000a).  
 
Figure 5: Relationship between market to book value and revaluation for 1998 
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Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics for independent variables for 2005 
  SIZE DEBT INTENS LIQ MV/BV 
REV group     
   Mean  4.946796 0.242123 0.560709 1.6328 2.969182 
   Median 4.861493 0.23091 0.565101 1.01 2.265983 
   Standard deviation 0.150994 0.045721 0.059402 0.312553 0.54289 
PRREV group 
   Mean  4.494864 0.200018 0.624887 1.684 3.256174 
   Median 5.606629 0.061606 0.724827 1.58 2.501697 
   Standard deviation 1.13142 0.108472 0.10774 0.513689 0.81777 
NONREV group 
   Mean  4.103922 0.231509 0.323455 1.925369 2.670966 
   Median 4.447871 0.211976 0.227654 1.01 1.608076 
   Standard deviation 0.214805 0.028709 0.034453 0.347783 0.447801 
Down group 
   Mean  4.740792 0.204876 0.341767 1.1675 1.232881 
   Median 4.623828 0.20189 0.177037 1.17 1.138841 
   Standard deviation 0.20013 0.050195 0.131107 0.148369 0.313252 
 
 
4.1.5.1  Firm Size 
Figure 6 shows similar trend obtained in 1998 (shown in Figure 1).  The figure shows 
firms with highest sales figures revalue their assets in the reporting year. The figure also 
shows that the sample of firms that devalue their assets in the current year consists of 
firms with very high sales figures. We therefore conclude that the firms with the highest 
sales figures are likely to either revalue or devalue their assets in that same year. Firms 
with high sales figures are always perceived as bigger firms. They are more likely to be 
audited by international accounting firms. Prior research (Lin and Peasnell, 2000a) has 
hypothesised that bigger firms with bigger auditors are more likely to annually revise 
their asset values due to the pressure from their auditors. 
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Figure 6: Relationship between firm size and revaluation for 2005 
 
Firms with the lowest sales have no prior (past three year) history of revaluation or 
devaluation. Smaller firms are more likely to have smaller auditors and less pressure from 
investors. These firms have not revalued their assets in any of the relevant three years. 
 
 
4.1.5.2  Gearing or Debt 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the level of debt and the decision to revalue. We 
find that the most highly geared firms are equally likely to revalue or not revalue their 
assets in that year. No explainable pattern is observed from Figure 7. This implies gearing 
does not play a very significant role in the revaluation decision. 
 
Figure 7: Relationship between gearing and revaluation for 2005 
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4.1.5.3  Intensity 
Figure 8 reveals a relationship between intensity and the revaluation decision. We find 
that fixed asset intensity plays a significant role in the revaluation or devaluation decision. 
The higher the amount of fixed assets in the asset portfolio of a firm, the more likely it 
will revalue its assets. However, Figure 8 does not explain the timing of the revaluation 
decision. 
 
Figure 8: Relationship between fixed asset intensity and revaluation for 2005 
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Figure 9: Relationship between liquidity and revaluation for 2005 
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4.1.5.5  Market Value to Book Value 
Figure 10 shows firms in 2005 with the highest market to book value ratio had revalued 
their fixed assets either in the year under investigation or in the preceding two year period. 
A high market to book value ratio signifies growth opportunities or undervalued assets. 
The REV group of firms have a mean MV/BV ratio of 3. This indicates that the market is 
willing to pay 3 times the book value of the assets to acquire them. Revaluation may thus 
be seen as management‟s way of reducing the information asymmetry between the firm 
and its investors. Our result also shows that the firms with the least market value to book 
value ratios (i.e. ratios close to 1) devalued their assets. 
 
Figure 10: Relationship between market to book value and revaluation for 2005 
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Table 4.7). Therefore, we cannot confidently conclude that the coefficients of our 
independent variables are significantly different from zero.  
 
 
The results in Table 4.7 show that the independent variables (size, gearing, liquidity, 
intensity, market value to book value ratio) do not explain the decision by firms to 
revalue or devalue their fixed assets. This may be because there is an external variable or 
an omitted variable not represented in our models which explains the decision of firms to 
revalue their assets. New Zealand recovered from a recession in 1998 and we believe that 
this is a strong external economic and political factor that would have influenced our 
results for this year. It is no surprise that the model Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R 
squares are low (i.e. below 0.10 in most cases).  
 
 
Table 4.7: Comparison between REV and NONREV (Model 1) for 1998 
 B Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Statistic 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Level of 
Significance 
Exp (B) 
Size .087 .432 .041 1 .839 1.091 
Gearing  -.856 2.310 .137 1 .711 .425 
Intensity .152 1.306 .014 1 .907 1.165 
Liquidity .462 .545 .719 1 .397 1.587 
MV/BV -.143 .179 .637 1 .425 .867 
Constant -.976 2.244 .189 1 .664 .377 
Chi Squared    5 .821 2.197 
-2Log 
Likelihood 
     39.813 
Cox & Snell 
R Squared 
     .064 
Nagelkerke 
R square 
     .089 
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4.1.6.2  Model 2: Comparison between REV and (PRREV + NONREV) 
 
Similar to Model 1, the high chi squared value obtained (see Table 4.8) shows that we 
cannot confidently conclude that there was a relationship between revaluation or the 
decision to revalue and level of firm internal variables such as liquidity, fixed asset 
intensity, gearing, size and the market to book value ratio. This is because the 
independent variables used in the study did not adequately explain the decision 
by firm to revalue their assets for the period 1998.   This is further 
constrained by the sample size and observations used in the study.  
 
Table 4.8: Comparison between REV and (PRREV + NONREV) (Model 2) for 1998 
 B Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Statistic 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Level of 
Significance 
Exp (B) 
Size -.066 .395 .028 1 .867 .936 
Gearing  -1.518 2.290 .439 1 .507 .219 
Intensity .459 1.279 .129 1 .720 1.583 
Liquidity .158 .410 .148 1 .700 1.171 
MV/BV -.168 .186 .812 1 .368 .846 
Constant .026 1.924 .000 1 .989 1.026 
Chi Squared    5 .872 1.830 
-2Log 
Likelihood 
     41.744 
Cox & Snell 
R Squared 
     .051 
Nagelkerke 
R square 
     .072 
 
 
4.1.6.3  Model 3: Comparison between (REV + PRREV) and NONREV 
 
In Table 4.9, the results obtained for Model 3 are similar to the results obtained for Model 
1 and 2. The conclusion remains that, due to the size of the Chi square obtained, we 
cannot statistically justify a relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables for the year 1998. 
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Table 4.9: Comparison between (REV + PRREV) and NONREV (Model) 3 for 1998 
 B Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Statistic 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Level of 
Significance 
Exp (B) 
Size .255 .435 .344 1 .558 1.291 
Gearing  -.381 2.190 .030 1 .862 .683 
Intensity -.207 1.282 .026 1 .871 .813 
Liquidity .686 .476 2.077 1 .150 1.985 
MV/BV -.130 .175 .550 1 .458 .878 
Constant -1.864 2.211 .711 1 .399 .155 
Chi Squared    5 .553 3.975 
-2Log 
Likelihood 
     42.205 
Cox & Snell 
R Squared 
     .107 
Nagelkerke 
R square 
     .147 
 
 
 
4.1.6.4  Model 4: Comparison between Down and (PRREV + NONREV) 
 
Model 4 compares the dependent variables for firms that devalue their fixed assets and 
firms that had either not revalued their fixed assets in 1998 or had previously revalued 
their fixed assets in either of the relevant two years. Table 4.10 shows that the model Chi 
square of 11.692 with a P value of 0.039 is significant at the 0.05 level of significance. 
We can therefore conclude that a firm‟s decision to devalue its assets in 1998 is strongly 
dependent on one or more of the five dependent variables in the model. We can further 
investigate the overall fit of the model and the individual contributions of the different 
dependent variables from the results obtained above. 
 
A high Nagelkerke R square of 0.61 shows that our model has a high explanatory ability 
and thus performs well. From Table 4.10, we find that the decision to devalue fixed assets 
in 1998 is positively related to the size and the market value of the firm and negatively 
related to the level of gearing, fixed asset intensity and firm‟s liquidity. 
 
Fixed asset intensity (INTENS) has the highest coefficient of all the variables followed 
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by gearing and then the firm size. The higher the fixed asset intensity of a firm, the less 
likely it is to devalue its assets. This may be because a devaluation of fixed assets by one 
percent may take off a large proportion of the worth of a firm. However, firms with a 
small amount of fixed assets in their total assets are likely to willingly devalue these 
assets since devaluation does not reduce the firm‟s value significantly. 
  
Exp (B) of 456.8 shows that for each additional unit of size increases the probability of a 
devaluation decision in a firm up to 456 times. Even though fixed asset intensity and 
gearing are negatively related to the decision to devalue, the results show that the 
probability that a firm would devalue its fixed assets did not decrease as more units of 
gearing or intensity are added. This is indicated by an Exp (B) of 0.00.  
 
The P values of all five independent variables are greater than the 10% error margin we 
are willing to accept. However, the variable representing market value to book value ratio 
(MV/BV) has a P Value of 0.13 which might be accepted as significant in this analysis. 
 
From the results, we find that decisions to revalue and devalue are not both dependent on 
the firm internal variables under investigation.  
 
 
Table 4.10: Comparison between Down and (PRREV + NONREV) (Model 4) for 1998 
 B Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Statistic 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Level of 
Significance 
Exp (B) 
Size 6.124 4.928 1.545 1 .214 456.801 
Gearing  -9.412 7.461 1.591 1 .207 .000 
Intensity -13.895 12.540 1.228 1 .268 .000 
Liquidity -2.187 2.614 .700 1 .403 .112 
MV/BV .757 .511 2.195 1 .138 2.133 
Constant -27.568 23.364 1.392 1 .238 .000 
Chi Squared    5 .039 11.692 
-2Log 
Likelihood 
     11.274
 
Cox & Snell 
R Squared 
     .341 
Nagelkerke 
R square 
     .610 
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4.1.6.5  Summary of Logistic Regression Results for 1998 
 
A summary showing the coefficients and P values obtained for all four models is shown 
in Table 4.11. Table 4.11 shows the Level of gearing, the Firm size, and the Fixed asset 
intensity contribute most to the devaluation decision. Gearing and Intensity are negatively 
correlated with the devaluation decision indicating that firms which are highly geared or 
highly fixed asset intensive are less likely to devalue their assets. On the other hand, big 
firms (modelled by their level of sales) are more likely to devalue their assets. 
 
The empirical results show that none of the independent coefficients is significantly 
different from zero in all 4 models. The independent variables, Liquidity and Market to 
Book value ratio have the least explanatory power on the decision to revalue (see Table 
4.11).  
 
 
Table 4.11: Summary of coefficients and P values of Models 1-4 for 1998 
    1998     
Explanatory Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 variable Sign -0.97625 0.0257 -1.86414 -27.5682 
Intercept ? 0.6636 0.9893 0.3991 0.238 
GEARING + -0.85636 -1.51782 -0.3806 -9.41245 
  0.7109 0.5075 0.862 0.2071 
LIQ - 0.461609 0.1579 0.685556 -2.18708 
  0.3966 0.7003 0.1495 0.4027 
MV/BV + -0.14258 -0.16768 -0.12994 0.757495 
  0.4249 0.3675 0.4584 0.1385 
SIZE + 0.087474 -0.06626 0.255408 6.124248 
  0.8394 0.8668 0.5576 0.2139 
INTENS + 0.152393 0.459035 -0.20739 -13.8947 
  0.9071 0.7197 0.8715 0.2679 
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4.1.6.6 Relationship between the Dependent and Independent 
Variables for 1998 
 
Table 4.12 shows that as opposed to the findings and predictions of other researchers 
(Missonier-Piera, 2007; Cotter and Zimmer, 1995; Lin and Peasnell, 2000a), the level of 
gearing is inversely related to the probability of a revaluation decision in our 1998 sample. 
Again, Liquidity seemingly though not consistently, has a positive relationship with the 
dependent variable while the MV/BV variable shows a negative relationship. We should 
be careful in interpreting these results since Models 1, 2 and 3 are not statistically robust.  
 
Table 4.12: Summary of the relationship between variables in Models 1 to 4 for 1998 
 Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gearing/Debt + - - - - 
Liquidity - + + + - 
Market Value to Book Value + - - - + 
Size + + - + + 
Intensity + + + - - 
 
 
4.1.7 Test Results Obtained for Model Analysis for 2005 
 
4.1.7.1  Model 1: Comparison between REV and NONREV 
 
Model 1 compares the REV group and NONREV group. Table 4.13 shows that the model 
chi square of 15.413 is significant at the 0.01 level of significance. We ascertain that there 
is a significant relationship between the decision whether or not to revalue fixed and the 
firm‟s level of gearing, size, intensity, liquidity and market value to book value ratio.  
 
The Cox and Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square are very low i.e. 0.157 and 
0.227 respectively indicating that the independent variables in the logistic regression 
(comparing current revaluers to consistent non revaluers) do not fully explain variations 
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in the dependent variable (revaluation). We can conclude that there might be other 
important variables our model did not capture but we will explain the motivations of 
firms to revalue their fixed assets in any given year. Other studies have cited other 
variables, such as profitability, previous revaluations, future operating performance, 
economic forces and political costs which affect the revaluation decision of firms (Lin 
and Peasnell, 2000b; Jaggi and Tsui, 2001; Aboody et al., 1999). 
 
The decision to revalue assets is found to be directly related to the firm size, fixed asset 
intensity and firm liquidity. It is negatively related to the gearing and market value to 
book value ratio of the firm. Our results show that only the coefficients of size and fixed 
asset intensity are significant at 0.10 and 0.01 levels respectively. An increase in a firm‟s 
size by one unit does not significantly increase the probability of a revaluation decision in 
the current year but an increase in the fixed asset intensity in any year by one unit 
increases the probability of a revaluation 12-fold (see Table 4.13). Intensity is thus the 
most contributory variable and the main determinant in this model. 
 
 
Table 4.13: Comparison between REV and NONREV (Model 1) for 2005 
 B Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Statistic 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Level of 
Significance 
Exp (B) 
Size*** .445 .247 3.240 1 .072 1.561 
Gearing  -1.184 1.547 .586 1 .444 .306 
Intensity* 2.531 .900 7.919 1 .005 12.569 
Liquidity .003 .122 .001 1 .980 1.003 
MV/BV -.017 .083 .042 1 .837 .983 
Constant -3.802 1.329 8.188 1 .004 .022 
Chi Squared    5 .009 15.413 
-2Log 
Likelihood 
     90.939
 
Cox & Snell 
R Squared 
     .157 
Nagelkerke 
R square 
     .227 
* Significant at the 0.01 level  
*** Significant at the 0.10 level  
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4.1.7.2  Model 2: Comparison between REV and (PRREV + NONREV) 
 
Model 2 compares the REV group and the (PRREV + NONREV) group. Model 2 has a P 
value of 0.01 and is significant at the 0.01 level of significance (see Table 4.14). We 
therefore conclude that the coefficient of one or more of the independent variables in the 
model is significantly different from zero. 
 
Similar to Model 1, the Cox and Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square are both 
below 0.30 indicating that our model does not have full explanatory power. Some 
variables which could further explain the motivations for revaluation of fixed assets have 
been omitted. This includes macroeconomic country specific variables, such as economic 
growth forecasts, employment, national debt levels, interest rates, and exchange rates. 
 
For the firms in these groups, the decision whether to revalue is found to be positively 
related to the firm‟s fixed asset intensity, the firm‟s liquidity, the firm‟s size and the firm‟s 
market value to book value ratio. The revaluation decision is also found to be negatively 
related to the firm‟s gearing level. According to the Wald statistics and the P value (sig.), 
we find that at the 0.10 level of significance both the firm size and the fixed asset 
intensity have a significant positive relationship with revaluation. 
 
Similarly, we find that intensity is the variable with the most contributory power. An 
increase in the fixed asset intensity by one unit may increase the probability of a 
revaluation decision up to 11 times (see Table 4.14). 
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Table 4.14: Comparison between REV and (PRREV + NONREV) (Model 2) for 2005 
 B Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Statistic 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Level of 
Significance 
Exp (B) 
Size*** .452 .256 3.119 1 .077 1.572 
Gearing  -1.063 1.535 .480 1 .489 .345 
Intensity* 2.439 .861 8.014 1 .005 11.460 
Liquidity .028 .121 .052 1 .820 1.028 
MV/BV .006 .081 .005 1 .944 1.006 
Constant -4.065 1.373 8.763 1 .003 .017 
Chi Squared    5 .010 15.046 
-2Log 
Likelihood 
     96.256
 
Cox & Snell 
R Squared 
     .142 
Nagelkerke 
R square 
     .210 
* Significant at the 0.01 level  
*** Significant at the 0.10 level  
 
 
4.1.7.3  Model 3: Comparison between (REV + PRREV) and NONREV 
 
Model 3 compares (REV + PRREV) and NONREV, that is, firms that have revalued their 
fixed assets either in the present year or in any of the previous two years and firms which 
have not revalued their fixed assets in the three year period. From Table 4.15, we find that 
with this group of firms, the revaluation decision is positively related to the firm‟s size 
and the firm‟s fixed asset intensity and negatively related to the firm‟s level of gearing, 
liquidity and its market value to book value ratio. Based on the Wald statistic and the P 
values, our results show that only the size and intensity are significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance. The contributory power of both variables is the same as in Models 1 and 2. 
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Table 4.15: Comparison between (REV + PRREV) and NONREV (Model 3) for 2005 
 B Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Statistic 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Level of 
Significance 
Exp (B) 
Size** .452 .215 4.416 1 .036 1.571 
Gearing  -1.661 1.419 1.370 1 .242 .190 
Intensity** 1.918 .794 5.831 1 .016 6.810 
Liquidity -.071 .118 .367 1 .545 .931 
MV/BV -.075 .082 .838 1 .360 .928 
Constant -2.837 1.090 6.769 1 .009 .059 
Chi Squared    5 .012 14.701 
-2Log 
Likelihood 
     110.513 
Cox & Snell 
R Squared 
     .139 
Nagelkerke 
R square 
     .193 
** Significant at the 0.05 level  
 
 
4.1.7.4  Model 4: Comparison between Down and (PRREV + NONREV) 
 
The high P value in this model (see Table 4.16) makes the model problematic. We cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of independent variables are significantly 
different from zero. We therefore cannot conclude that in 2005 the decision whether or 
not to devalue fixed assets was reliant on one or more of these independent variables. 
Even though we cannot ascertain a significant statistical relationship between dependent 
and independent variables, we find that the level of gearing and the level of fixed assets 
within the companies in the sample have the most explanatory power on the decision to 
devalue assets. 
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Table 4.16: Comparison between Down and (PRREV + NONREV) (Model 4) for 2005 
 B Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Statistic 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Level of 
Significance 
Exp (B) 
Size .182 .344 .280 1 .597 1.199 
Gearing  -3.524 4.103 .738 1 .390 .029 
Intensity** 3.793 1.868 4.124 1 .042 44.405 
Liquidity -.013 .218 .004 1 .953 .987 
MV/BV .007 .157 .002 1 .966 1.007 
Constant -4.547 1.923 5.593 1 .018 .011 
Chi Squared    5 .344 5.630 
-2Log 
Likelihood 
     31.515 
Cox & Snell 
R Squared 
     .070 
Nagelkerke 
R square 
     .184 
* *Significant at the 0.05 level  
 
 
4.1.7.5  Summary of Logistic Regression Results for 2005 
 
A summary showing the coefficients and P values obtained for all the four models is 
shown in Table 4.17. The results show the level of Gearing and Fixed asset intensity 
contributes most to the revaluation or devaluation decision. Gearing is negatively 
correlated with the revaluation decision indicating that firms which are highly geared are 
less likely to revalue their assets upwards. The results show only fixed asset intensity 
(INTENS) is significantly different from zero in all 4 models. 
 
The magnitude of the „SIZE‟ variable appears to be small thus having a smaller impact on 
the revaluation decision, but the results show that SIZE is statistically significant in 
Models 1, 2 and 3. The results also show Liquidity and Market to Book value ratio have 
the least explanatory power on the decision to revalue.  
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Table 4.17: Summary of coefficients and P values of Models 1 to 4 for 2005 
    2005     
Explanatory Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 variable Sign -3.80167 -4.06522 -2.83672 -4.54705 
Intercept ? 0.0042 0.0031 0.0093 0.018 
GEARING + -1.18406 -1.06322 -1.66092 -3.52351 
  0.444 0.4885 0.2417 0.3904 
LIQ - 0.003021 0.027558 -0.07127 -0.01298 
  0.9802 0.82 0.5446 0.9525 
MV/BV + -0.01703 0.005655 -0.07498 0.00667 
  0.8372 0.9443 0.3598 0.9662 
SIZE + 0.445137 0.45247 0.451567 0.181776 
  0.0719 0.0774 0.0356 0.5969 
INTENS + 2.531245 2.438823 1.918381 3.793358 
  0.0049 0.0046 0.0157 0.0423 
 
 
 
4.1.7.6 Relationship between the Dependent and Independent Variables for 
2005 
 
Prior research has depicted a positive relationship between gearing and revaluation 
(Missonier-Piera, 2007; Cotter and Zimmer; 1995; Lin and Peasnell, 2000a). However, 
none of our models support these findings (see Table 4.18). Our findings on the effects of 
firm size and fixed asset intensity corroborate the work of Lin and Peasnell (2000a). 
From the analysis and past researches, the consensus is that a firm with a higher sales 
figure (bigger size) and higher fixed asset intensity is more likely to revalue its assets 
(Lin and Peasnell, 2000a). 
 
Our findings for the effects of liquidity and market value to book value ratio (MV/BV) on 
the revaluation decision are mixed (see Table 4.18). Lin and Peasnell (2000a), in their 
discussions, were unable to predict a relationship between the MV/BV and the 
revaluation decision because they interacted in various ways and it is unclear which 
forces will prevail in any particular situation. The high P values obtained for the MV/BV 
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and Liquidity variables in all four models show that both MV/BV and Liquidity variables 
play an insignificant role in the revaluation decision. Similarly, the effect of Gearing is 
also insignificant even though the variable posit a relationship with the dependent 
variable. 
 
 
Table 4.18: Summary of the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables for 2005 
 Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gearing/Debt + - - - - 
Liquidity - + + - - 
Market Value to Book Value + - + - + 
Size + + + + + 
Intensity + + + + + 
 
 
 
 4.1.8 Test Results Obtained for Multicollinearity between Variables 
There is a possibility that our independent variables are correlated thus giving rise to the 
issue of multicollinearity. This might seriously undermine the results of our logistic 
regression. Firms with huge stocks of fixed assets are more likely to acquire or employ 
debt capital in their operations. Thus gearing and fixed asset intensity in our model might 
be related. Further analyses are carried out (shown in Table 4.19) to investigate any 
incidence of this phenomenon. 
 
Table 4.19 shows the correlation between the independent variables is very low and thus 
will not have a significant effect on the results obtained from the multiple regression 
analysis. Therefore, multicollinearity does not pose a problem in our regression models. 
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Table 4.19: Multicollinearity between the variables  
   1998   
 SIZE DEBT INTENS LIQ MV_BV 
SIZE 1 0.181017 0.322176 -0.15639 -0.02632 
DEBT 0.181017 1 0.059369 -0.21487 -0.04915 
INTENS 0.322176 0.059369 1 -0.11626 0.315158 
LIQ -0.15639 -0.21487 -0.11626 1 -0.02221 
MV_BV -0.02632 -0.04915 0.315158 -0.02221 1 
   2005   
SIZE 1 0.30274 0.211261 -0.17893 0.085494 
DEBT 0.30274 1 0.128295 -0.31848 0.020467 
INTENS 0.211261 0.128295 1 -0.1001 0.165365 
LIQ -0.17893 -0.31848 -0.1001 1 -0.18728 
MV_BV 0.085494 0.020467 0.165365 -0.18728 1 
 
 
4.2 Discussion Results for Research Question 6 
 
4.2.1 Sample Analysis 
 
Table 4.20 presents the sample of firms under investigation. The market index considered 
in this case is the New Zealand Exchange Share Index. Our sample consists of 19 New 
Zealand firms that revalued their assets between 2001 and 2005 inclusive. We find that 
some firms revalue their assets almost every year. Table 4.20 shows that seven of the 19 
firms under investigation revalued their assets five times in the five years under 
investigation, one firm revalued its assets four times in the five years, two firms revalued 
their assets three times, three firms revalued their assets twice and six firms revalued their 
assets once in the five years. The frequency of revaluation within the sample is 
summarised in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 shows that about 40% of firms involved in the study are frequent or consistent 
revaluers, while about 30% of firms involved are infrequent revaluers. In a bid to 
understand the motivation to consistently revalue, we further investigated to see if the 
probability of a revaluation depends on its industry or its level of fixed asset intensity. 
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Table 4.20:  Revaluation Date  
Firm  Revaluation Date    
Auckland International Airport       Jun-01    
       Jun-02    
       Jun-03    
       Jun-04    
        Jun-05    
Allied Farmers Ltd       Jun-05    
Broadway Industries Ltd       Jun-05    
Colonial Motor Firm Ltd       Jun-01    
       Jun-02    
       Jun-03    
       Jun-04    
        Jun-05    
Fletcher Building Ltd       Jun-01    
       Jun-02    
        Jun-03    
Horizon Electricity Distribution Ltd       Mar-01    
       Mar-02    
       Mar-03    
       Mar-04    
        Mar-05    
Heritage Gold NZ Ltd       Mar-01    
        Mar-02    
Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd       Aug-04    
        Aug-05    
Infratil Ltd       Mar-02    
       Mar-03    
       Mar-04    
        Mar-05    
ING Medical Properties Trust        Jun-05    
Kiwi Income Property Trust       Mar-01    
       Mar-02    
       Mar-03    
       Mar-04    
        Mar-05    
Lombard Group Ltd       Jun-02    
Lyttelton Port Firm Ltd       Jun-05    
Millennium & Copthorne New Zealand Ltd       Dec-05    
Metlifecare Ltd        Dec-01    
       Dec-02    
       Dec-03    
       Dec-04    
        Dec-05    
Port of Tauranga Ltd       Jun-01    
       Jun-02    
       Jun-03    
       Jun-04    
        Jun-05    
Ryman HealthCare Ltd       Mar-03    
       Mar-04    
        Mar-05    
Sanford Ltd       Aug-01    
       Aug-02    
       Aug-03    
       Aug-04    
        Aug-05    
Trustpower Ltd       Mar-04    
        Mar-05    
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Figure 11: Revaluation in firms within the sample 
 
 
 
Table 4.21 looks at the fixed asset intensity of frequent revalues. We find that all 
companies which revalued their assets five times in the period under investigation are 
highly intensive companies with respect to their levels of fixed assets. 
 
 
Table 4.21: Frequent Revaluers, Fixed Asset Intensity and Industry Specifics 
Consistent 
Revaluers Frequency Fixed Asset Intensity Other notes 
    
Auckland IA 5 Highly Intensive Buildings, runways and equipment 
Colonial 
MC 5 Highly Intensive Huge stacks of vehicles and equipment 
Horizon ED 5 Highly Intensive 
Equipment for electricity production and 
distribution 
Kiwi 
Income  5 Highly Intensive Property investments 
Metlifecare 5 Highly Intensive Group has huge investments in property 
Port of 
Tauranga 5 Highly Intensive Buildings, docks and equipments 
Sanford Ltd 5 Highly Intensive 
Seafood, fishing, preservation, storage and 
distribution equipment 
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Table 4.22 and Figure 12 show that the number of revaluation announcements made each 
year was almost constant until year 2005. We find that over 28% of our sample 
revaluation announcements are made in 2005. An average of 10 revaluation 
announcements are made each year between 2001 and 2004, while 16 announcements are 
made in 2005. This year (2005) coincides with the adoption of the IFRS by New Zealand. 
 
 
Table 4.22: Yearly Rate of Revaluation within the sample 
Years 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Number of events 9 11 10 11 16 57 
Percentage 15.8 19.3 17.5 19.3 28.1 100 
 
 
Figure 12: Yearly rate of revaluation within the sample 
 
 
 
4.2.2  Average Residuals and Cumulated Average Residuals Computed 
 
 
Table 4.23 summarises the results obtained for the monthly average residual and the 
monthly cumulative average residual. 
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Table 4.23: Results obtained for average residuals and cumulative average residuals for 
the sample under analysis in the test period 
Month Relative Announcement 
Date 
Average Residuals 
(AR) 
Cumulative Average Residuals 
(CAR) 
-12 0.292516731 0.292516731 
-11 0.96399221 1.256508941 
-10 -0.204312052 1.05219689 
-9 -0.144070471 0.908126419 
-8 1.250738177 2.158864595 
-7 -0.43634164 1.722522955 
-6 0.181387816 1.903910771 
-5 0.624304097 2.528214868 
-4 -0.452687597 2.075527271 
-3 -0.150146776 1.925380496 
-2 -0.073850696 1.851529799 
-1 -0.070443712 1.781086087 
0 0.562072134 2.343158221 
1 0.03153884 2.374697061 
2 0.669053398 3.043750458 
3 -0.605536399 2.43821406 
4 0.593200524 3.031414583 
5 -0.3685523 2.662862283 
6 -0.097140722 2.565721561 
7 1.145497713 3.711219274 
8 -0.54708004 3.164139234 
9 0.06358343 3.227722664 
10 -0.69971118 2.528011484 
11 0.692283471 3.220294955 
12 -0.078564782 3.141730174 
 
Table 4.23 shows that the monthly average residuals do not follow any set pattern. It is 
almost equally likely to earn positive abnormal returns as it is to earn negative abnormal 
returns. In the four month period prior to the event date, we find that the average 
residuals are all negative. This trend is not repeated elsewhere in the event window. Even 
though the residuals prior to the event day are negative, we find that their magnitude 
gradually reduces as we approach the event day. On the event day (month zero), the 
average residuals revert to positive territory. We find a slight gain of 0.562% as shown in 
Table 4.23. These gains are not immediately lost. They are maintained for at least two 
months after the event date. Although we find more positive average residuals in the 
subsequent months, these are interspersed with negative average residuals. This complex 
mix of positive and negative residuals makes it difficult to identify a pattern and thus 
impossible to understand the reasons for these subsequent gains or losses. 
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Accumulation of the average residuals obtained during the entire period presents an 
empirically more explainable picture. We find that even though some months had 
registered negative abnormal returns, the general trend is a resultant gain from the event. 
The issue with cumulating average residuals may be due to the event window being too 
long and thus might have included gains realised from other major announcements and 
events (noise). Given that the event is an announcement of a revaluation of fixed assets, 
we can assume that it might be difficult for investors to anticipate this kind of 
announcement 12 months prior to the announcement date. Even if this was anticipated, 
the announcement would have been made in the quarterly or biannual reports. We 
therefore observed the cumulated average residuals over a shorter period, as shown in the 
Table 4.24. 
 
 
Table 4.24: Shortened Test period to observe average residuals and Cumulative average 
residuals around the event date 
 
Month Relative Announcement 
Date 
Average Residuals 
(AR) 
Cumulative Average Residuals 
(CAR) 
-2 -0.0738507 -0.0738507 
-1 -0.0704437 -0.1442944 
0 0.5620721 0.4177777 
1 0.0315388 0.4493166 
2 0.6690534 1.11837 
 
The cumulated average residuals in the run-up to the event date are negative. These 
negative residuals are however offset by the huge positive abnormal returns earned on 
announcement day. These gains are maintained in the subsequent two months.  
 
When we observe Figure 13 for the 25-month period, we find no significant shift in 
month 0 – event day. The figure shows that more significant gains are obtained in month -
11, month -8, and month 7. Our research design does not explain the gains obtained in 
these months. We observe that losses are made in the four months that preceded the 
announcement day. There is a reversal of trend leading to a slight gain in the 
announcement month. The following month sees a steep drop to almost zero abnormal 
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returns. The absence of any overly significant gains in the announcement month could be 
explained in two ways.  
 
 The information are absorbed by the market in the preceding months or  
 The information received by the market is price irrelevant.  
 
 
Figure 13: Average Residuals that were accrued over the test period 
 
 
Emanuel (1989) working on a sample of New Zealand firms between 1970 and 1979 find 
that Asset Revaluation is a pure accounting artefact. The implication is that investors are 
not deluded by a purported increase in the value of their assets through a revaluation 
exercise. If firms are aware of this, then we can safely assume that the motive of asset 
revaluation by firms is not to mislead investors about the state of affairs but to reduce the 
information asymmetry between investors and management through better disclosure. 
Asset revaluation announcements seem to be an indicator of future expectations. 
Investors are also aware that management might decide to revalue assets for several 
reasons. Naturally, we expect that asset revaluation announcements will not be 
interpreted by investors as a positive signal unless there are other affirming positive 
indicators, such as sustained profitability, reducing debt levels, increasing sales levels, etc. 
Standish and Ung (1982) find that positive abnormal returns accrued to firms that 
announced fixed asset revaluations but after careful analysis they conclude that 
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revaluation announcements are only used as pointers and the market needs more 
information to assess the probable future position of firms. Courtenay and Cahan (2004) 
find that a high level of corporate debt actually impedes the levels of gains that accrue on 
revaluation announcements. These results are also obtained by Aboody et al. (1999). We 
do not however consider the debt levels of firms within our sample. The low 
announcement gains we have obtained might be due to the fact that some of the firms 
within our sample are highly geared. 
 
On the other hand, if this information had already been incorporated into the current 
share prices so that in effect the information was already anticipated, then through a 
cumulative of average residuals we can effectively capture the effect of these 
announcements over our sample. Figure 14 investigates this possibility. 
 
 
Figure 14: Cumulative Average residuals that were accrued over the test period 
 
 
As discussed above, there is always a possibility that due to information leakage the 
abnormal returns might have been gained in the run up period to the event date (month). 
Price corrections or adjustments might be expected to occur as the market reassesses and 
re-evaluates the complete information after the event date. We therefore might expect 
prices to move up or down after the event and the results obtained in Figure 14 might not 
be unusual. Figure 14 shows that the cumulative positive average residuals are obtained 
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over the event window (month -12 to month +12). We however realised that high gains 
that are accrued until month 5 were quickly lost due to the high negative average 
residuals accrued in the four months immediately preceding the announcement day 
(month). The gains obtained up until month 0 are not lost in the subsequent 12 month 
period. 
 
In Figure 15 we refocus on the period around the event day. Similar to Table 4.24, we 
minimise the effect of external influences by observing cumulated average residuals 
around the event date. In Figure 15 we observe cumulated average residuals over a 
shorter period of five months – two months before the event day and two months after the 
event day. The results are shown below: 
 
 
Figure 15: Recalculated cumulated average residuals obtained over a shortened test 
period 
 
 
With a significantly shortened event window we are able to show that gains accrue to 
firms announcing asset revaluations. The significance of these gains is subject to further 
statistical analysis. We can observe a slight nudge in Month Zero representing a slight 
gain due to the announcement. This announcement gain is maintained in the subsequent 
two months (see Figure 15). 
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4.2.3 Comparison between Frequent Revaluers and First Time Revaluers 
 
In the sample under investigation, we find that some firms (frequent revaluers) revalue 
their assets almost as a matter of policy while others (first time revaluers) only revalued 
their assets for the first time after the inception of the IFRS standards in New Zealand in 
2005. We classify these cases into two different subsamples (as shown in Table 4.25) for 
further investigation.  
 
Table 4.25: Cases constituting subsamples of Frequent Revaluers and First Time 
Revaluers 
Frequent Revaluers First Time Revaluers 
Auckland International Airport Allied Farmers Ltd 
Colonial Motor Firm Ltd Broadway Industries Ltd 
Horizon Electricity Distribution Ltd ING Medical Properties Trust 
Kiwi Property Trust Lyttelton Port Firm Ltd 
Sanford Ltd  
Port of Tauranga Ltd  
 
 
Table 4.26 shows the average residuals in the announcement month for the different 
subsamples are significantly different. On the announcement day (Month 0), Frequent 
revaluers only gained 0.8% abnormal returns while First Timer Revaluers earned a 
massive 4% on fixed asset revaluation announcements in 2005. In the case of Frequent 
Revaluers, the stock market had duly anticipated a revaluation in the current year (2005) 
and thus adjusted prices accordingly. Since frequent revaluers are noted for revaluing 
their assets yearly, the market discounts this information into current share prices and 
thus any revaluation announcement made will already be reflected in current share prices 
and investors will not act upon such information. 
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Table 4.26: Average Monthly Residuals for Frequent Revaluers and First Time  
 Revaluers in 2005 
Months 
     Frequent  
     Revaluers 
    First Time      
    Revaluers 
-12 0.024332208 0.040438005 
-11 0.025847312 0.034637665 
-10 -0.016280931 -0.018348621 
-9 0.037272702 0.030565568 
-8 0.008077034 -0.022078071 
-7 0.020439712 0.036382275 
-6 0.027442713 0.021882169 
-5 -0.010793248 0.001215777 
-4 0.026833144 0.019213505 
-3 -0.024845657 -0.02754791 
-2 0.002769396 -0.01092365 
-1 0.011976758 -0.018786534 
0 0.008996644 0.045043402 
1 0.015498654 0.029467971 
2 -0.017534498 -0.015612773 
3 0.02748522 0.016520035 
4 -0.00761558 -0.025265456 
5 -0.012208896 -0.002276491 
6 0.014999293 0.028124349 
7 -0.012991403 -0.009572922 
8 -0.000845154 -0.008519884 
9 0.036093019 0.060728028 
10 0.001494483 0.017818066 
11 -0.028240021 -0.033846723 
12 0.015957809 -0.015364267 
 
An asset revaluation announcement in the case of first time revaluers is a „surprise‟ to 
„the market‟ and thus „the market‟ reacted by adjusting prices on the announcement day. 
For First Time revaluers, a revaluation announcement is not anticipated and thus the 
market receives this information as new information and acts upon immediately. We thus 
expect that if such information is relevant, prices should move significantly once the 
information is made to public. We therefore expect that if asset revaluation information is 
price relevant, then the market‟s reaction should be significantly different in both cases. 
From the results obtained, we deduce that asset revaluation information is price relevant. 
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Figure 16 shows the difference in monthly residuals earned by Frequent Revaluers and 
First Time Revaluers. We find that in the announcement month, Month 0, the difference 
in average residuals is quite significant. This signifies that the information received by 
the market (Asset Revaluation) is price sensitive. 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Average monthly residuals for Frequent Revaluers (FR) and First Time 
Revaluers (FTR) 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
 
5.1.1 Management Incentives (Research Questions 1 to 5) 
This study examines the revaluation choices made by New Zealand firms in 1998 and 
2005. The study evaluates the underlying variables which might have acted as a 
motivating factor for firm‟s revaluation decision. The study results show that fixed asset 
intensity and firm size significantly contribute to the revaluation decision. The results of 
all empirical models show that fixed asset intensity and firm size are positively correlated 
with the dependent variable (see Table 4.17). We therefore conclude that firms with high 
fixed asset intensity and/or firm size are most likely to adopt a continuous revaluation 
(positive or negative) policy. 
 
 
A change in the size of a firm by one unit (e.g. log [sales] changes by one unit) does not 
significantly increase the probability of a firm making a revaluation decision in that year. 
However, fixed asset intensity shows a very strong contributory power to the revaluation 
decision. A change in the fixed asset intensity of a firm by one unit increases the 
probability of a revaluation decision almost 13-fold in some cases (see Table 4.13). 
 
 
In contrast to the findings of previous studies (Whittred and Chan, 1992; Brown et al., 
1992; Missionier-Piera, 2007), the level of corporate gearing is negatively related to the 
probability of revaluing assets for the sample of New Zealand firms in this study. 
However, the effect of the level of gearing on the revaluation decision is insignificant. 
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Our results did not provide any significant outcomes and relationships for 1998. This is 
because 1998 signified the end of recession and the beginning of economic growth in 
New Zealand. At the end of a recession, the changes in the country‟s economic 
environment might have superseded individual firm considerations in management‟s 
decision making process. We propose that aside from firm internal variables, several 
external variables might have motivated firms to devalue or revalue their assets in 1998. 
These variables include economic growth (recovery from the 1998 recession) and 
changes in the legal framework (adoption of the IFRS in 2005) amongst others. 
 
 
5.1.2 Market Reaction (Research Question 6) 
The empirical results show that the practice of revaluation increases sharply with the 
adoption of the IFRS in 2005 in New Zealand. About 28.1% of the revaluation 
announcements under study are made in 2005 compared to just over 15.8% in 2001. 
 
 
We find that gains accrue to revaluing firms but these gains are not very significant. 
Given that other information was released at the same time, we cannot confidently 
associate all these gains to the fact that revaluation announcements are made. Thus, 
Standish and Ung‟s (1982) conclusion on their UK study might still hold in New Zealand 
today. The authors predicted that revaluation is probably seen by managers as a useful 
tool to influence capital market expectations about their firms but investors view 
revaluations in a fairly neutral way unless they receive associated positive signals or 
believe such signals will be shortly forthcoming 
 
 
Furthermore, the empirical results show negative returns accrue to firms prior to the 
publication of financial statements that carry revaluation announcements. These negative 
returns are reverted as soon as the revaluation information is made public. These gains 
are again maintained for at least a month after the announcements are made. The 
statistical significance of these gains is subject to further investigation.  
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Comparing Frequent Revaluers to First Time Revaluers, we find that asset revaluation 
information is relevant to investors. Frequent Revaluers gained only 0.8% Announcement 
Abnormal Returns while First Time Revaluers gained over 4% in the 2005 (see Table 
4.26).  
 
 
 
5.2   Policy Implications 
 
5.2.1 Management Incentives (Research Questions 1 to 5) 
The findings of this study bring to light several pertinent issues that may call into 
question the adequacy and sufficiency of policy. Firstly, it might interest policy makers to 
know whether firms revalue or devalue their fixed assets arbitrarily. Should revaluation 
or devaluation not be based on the principle of fair value? The study shows that other 
factors such as the level of debt, cash flows or liquidity, and the size of the firm do affect 
firms‟ decision to revalue or not. 
 
 
Logically and in principle, firms should only revalue or devalue when they are ascertain 
that the real or underlying value of their assets has been increased or decreased 
respectively, such that the values in financial statements do misrepresent the true state of 
affairs. If firms have other motives for revaluing or devaluing assets besides the principle 
of matching book values to real values, the exercise (revaluation) defeats its purpose. The 
finding that asset revaluations is motivated by changes in internal firm variables such as 
debt level, cash flows, liquidity and size questions the relevance and fairness of the 
revaluation process. There is little or no evidence to theoretically link firm size, debt level 
or liquidity with the probability of asset value appreciation. There is no evidence to show 
that bigger firms or more liquid firms are more susceptive to impairment of machinery. 
For example, one would not expect that the value of land owned by a more liquid and/or 
bigger firm appreciates/depreciates in value faster than land in the same country owned 
by a less liquid or smaller firm. Asset values are certainly shaped more by external 
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market influences. 
 
 
The evidence provided in this study, indicates therefore that asset revaluation process 
might be problematic. This may also point to certain weakness in the laws and 
regulations governing asset revaluations. In the long run, it might not be surprising to see 
cases of corporate fraud arising from such an area which gives considerable leeway for 
the manipulation of financial reports based on the judgement of management. 
 
Secondly, there is a question of whether the process is consistent across firms and across 
industries. The financial information released by the firms is only useful if it is consistent 
and comparable across all firms. If revaluations are solely based on management 
judgement and motivated by the internal state of affairs in a firm, then the practice will 
not be consistent across firms. This will reduce transparency and increase the information 
asymmetry between management, investors and regulators. 
 
 
5.2.2 Market Reaction (Research Question 6) 
The empirical results reveal that revaluation sends relevant information to investors. 
Whether this information is price sensitive and how this information is used by investors 
is subject to further research. 
 
 
This study concentrated on significant positive asset revaluations made by firms between 
2001 and 2005. In 2005, New Zealand adopted the IFRS standards which make 
revaluation optional for firms. Revaluers are however required to maintain a consistent 
revaluation practice. The implication of this study is that two competing firms within the 
same industry might be valued differently by virtue of their revaluation decision or their 
choice of whether to revalue or not. Since this information has been found to be of 
significance to investors, there is a question of whether firms who revalue their assets 
provide better disclosure to investors than their counterparts who do not. Is there a way of 
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disclosing this relevant information without necessarily revaluing assets? We find that 
some non revaluers might include a statement in their notes to financial statements that 
talks about current values of assets that have been historically accounted for in the 
balance sheet. Is this sufficient and does it include all relevant information needed by 
investors for their investment decision making? 
 
 
From the empirical results, the only way to achieve consistency in reporting while 
increasing disclosure of information is to make revaluation compulsory for all firms. In 
this way we can ensure that the basic principles of reporting including consistency and 
comparability will be enhanced. 
 
 
5.3   Research Limitations 
 
5.3.1 Management Incentives (Research Questions 1 to 5) 
 
5.3.1.1  The Size of Samples under Investigation 
A point of concern in this study is the small number of data points that have been used to 
draw the conclusion. For example in 1998 the variable, Down has only four observations 
while PREV has only two. Again for 2005, the variable Down has only six observations 
while PRREV has only eight. Despite this perceived shortfall, it is worth noting that the 
sample constitutes a comprehensive list of all registered public companies in New 
Zealand in the two years under investigation. Cases are only left out when the 
information required to undergo the research is unavailable in the database used for the 
study. The results therefore reveal an empirical picture of the motivations for revaluation 
in the New Zealand accounting environment.  
 
 
Despite this lack of a comprehensive data, the strength of the analysis is grounded in the 
fact that the original sample under investigation includes every listed firm in New 
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Zealand. The sample is only reduced due to incompleteness or unavailability of data in 
some of the cases under investigation. This data is classified as „missing data‟ in the 
databases and data sources which are employed in the study.  
 
Based on the empirical findings, strong trends could still be noticed that supported the 
conclusions that have been drawn from the study. Other measures of model strength such 
as Chi squared, R Squared, Likelihood, Z or Wald tests further helps to justify the results 
obtained.  
 
5.3.1.2            The Research Questions under Investigation 
A limitation of the study is that we did not investigate the relationship between individual 
variables and the fixed asset revaluation decision of the firms due to the time and 
resource constraints. We investigated the relationship between fixed asset revaluation and 
all five variables together. Therefore, although there is no significant statistical 
relationship between fixed asset revaluation and all five variables in 1998, there could be 
a significant relationship between fixed asset revaluation and each of the variables if 
investigated separately. However, we understand such analysis is not robust. 
 
Another limitation in terms of the research questions is that the research set up to 
ascertain the relationship between fixed asset revaluation and firm variables such as debt 
to equity ratio, liquidity, market to book, size and fixed asset intensity.  In the end, we 
were only able to determine the relationship between fixed asset revaluation and size and 
fixed asset revaluation and fixed asset intensity. Our results show that there is no 
statistical relationship between fixed asset revaluation and the other three independent 
variables (i.e. debt to equity, liquidity and Market to book). This result contradicts 
previous research and certainly worth to be explored in greater detail in future research. 
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5.3.2 Market Reaction (Research Question 6) 
 
5.3.2.1  The Research Design and the Market Model 
The market model employed in this study is designed to compute abnormal returns 
resulting from specific announcements. Information about asset revaluations in firms is 
only usually released together with other share price sensitive information (such as 
earnings and dividends) in published financial statements. Therefore, the abnormal 
returns earned on the publication of financial statements reflect the market‟s evaluation of 
not only information about asset revaluations but of all information that has been 
published. This model is not capable of segregating the abnormal returns that might have 
been accrued due to different items of information in the financial statements. The results 
we obtained relate to abnormal returns earned from the publication of financial 
statements. It is therefore empirically challenging to segregate the effects of each item of 
announcement to obtain the true contribution of the „Asset Revaluation‟ variable. 
 
 
Notwithstanding, Standish and Ung (1982) exclude the market model from their analysis 
because they found that estimates of alpha impacted behaviour in the period surrounding 
the announcement month. Standish and Ung (1982) show that the abnormal returns 
obtained by using the market model may be biased downwards. After testing several 
models for robustness, they (Standish and Ung, 1982), resolved to use the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). 
 
 
 
5.3.2.2  The Choice of Measurement Interval 
Several measurement intervals has been employed in previous studies including daily, 
weekly, fortnightly, and monthly amongst others. Sharpe and Walker (1975) and Standish 
and Ung (1982) investigate the relationship between revaluation announcements and 
share prices in Australia and the UK respectively used monthly data and an event window 
of 25 months. However, Morse (1984) investigating the bias and efficiency of the results 
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obtained from monthly and daily data came to the conclusion that shorter time periods are 
generally more suitable. Brown and Warner (1985) have corroborated these results 
through simulation studies. Longer event windows are problematic in that there is a 
higher probability of the inclusion of noise in the analysis. Other firm specific 
announcements such as quarterly results can also significantly move share prices and 
affect the results obtained.  
 
 
In this study, we believe that due to increased disclosure over the years (i.e. the 
publication of quarterly, semi-annual and annual results) a shorter time period such as 
daily data might have produced better results. 
 
 
5.4   Recommendations for Future Research 
 
5.4.1 Management Incentives (Research Questions 1 to 5) 
The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards in New Zealand is a major 
step towards improving financial reporting across firms in New Zealand. Our sample 
investigates the motivations for firms to revalue their fixed assets before the adoption of 
the IFRS from the 1
st
 January 2007. With new reporting standards, more research in this 
area using more recent data would be warranted. 
 
 
In a related study, partitioning the sample into different industries, for example, 
manufacturing, real estate, etc. might yield more useful and robust information. Fixed 
asset intensity varies across industries and what might be very high for one industry and 
lower for another. The decision whether or not to revalue assets and the frequency of 
fixed asset revaluation might be different for different industries. 
 
 
Our results indicate that the effect of a devaluation of fixed assets on the value of the firm 
 95 | P a g e  
 
in particular may have a huge impact on the decision whether or not to devalue assets. 
The effect might be in terms of a fall in market value or a fall in book value of assets. A 
new variable which accounts for this effect may explain a firm‟s reluctance to devalue its 
assets and this would give more explanatory power to the model. Future researchers may 
include a variable that captures the actual increase in a firm‟s fixed asset values by 
revaluation or devaluation 
 
 
5.4.2 Market Reaction (Research Question 6) 
The magnitude of the revaluations could have a material effect on the cumulative 
abnormal returns obtained upon announcement. This study (similar to Sharpe & Walker, 
1975) concentrates on the event, „an announcement of a material fixed revaluation‟ and 
not on the actual increase in the value of the assets. 
 
 
The study focuses on positive revaluations. The results would be more robust and 
conclusive if the effect of negative revaluations on stock prices is also investigated. If 
negative revaluations result in falling or negative cumulated average residuals, then the 
results would be more conclusive. Although this test will further strengthen the 
conclusions of this study, it was not carried out due to the lack of resources available to 
the researcher. 
 
 
Some researchers (Aboody et al., 1999; Courtenay and Cahan, 2004; Easton et al., 1993) 
have found that other factors such as debt to equity ratio of firms influence the value 
relevance of a revaluation decision. A regrouping or dissociation of the study sample into 
different subsamples with different debt to equity ratios might provide more insights into 
the relevance of revaluation decisions in New Zealand. Other firm characteristics, such as 
the firm‟s level of fixed assets, the industry, the magnitude of revaluation, and the 
frequency of revaluation might also play a part in the market response to a revaluation 
announcement. These factors are worth investigating. 
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